Hugging Face’s incident response team first turned to frontier AI models to analyze a breach of the company’s production infrastructure, and the models refused to help. Commercial safety guardrails built to stop attackers blocked every forensic query because they treated the IR team’s real exploit data the same way they would treat a live attack.

The attacker, an autonomous AI agent running the campaign end to end, moved laterally across the Hugging Face infrastructure for a weekend, undetected and unstopped.

Security leaders are quick to recognize the pattern and diagnose what went wrong. “I’ve seen versions of this during red-team exercises and internal security testing, but this is one of the first high-profile examples where it materially affected real incident response,” said Merritt Baer, senior adviser to Andesite, G2I, and AppOmni and former Deputy CISO at AWS.

None of this is unique to Hugging Face, Baer said. “Commercial frontier models optimize for preventing misuse. They generally have no cryptographic or organizational way to determine whether the person asking ‘analyze this malware’ is an incident responder or the malware author.”

A malicious dataset opened two code-execution paths

On July 16, Hugging Face disclosed that an autonomous AI agent system had compromised its production infrastructure, gaining unauthorized access to a limited set of internal datasets and several service credentials. The company verified that its software supply chain was clean and found no evidence of tampering with public models, datasets, or Spaces.

Hugging Face is still assessing whether the intrusion touched any partner or customer data and says it will contact affected parties directly as required. But few enterprise threat models had accounted for the attacker Hugging Face faced. An autonomous agent ran the entire campaign from initial access through credential harvesting. No human guided it.

The entry point was a malicious dataset. When the data-processing pipeline ingested it, the dataset triggered code execution in two ways, through a remote-code loader and through a template-injection flaw in dataset configuration files. No admission gate screened the file before it reached a processing worker, the compute job assigned to each dataset. Initial access came through the data pipeline itself, a route that worked because most enterprise security teams treat the data feeding their pipelines as trusted input rather than an attack surface.

Worker isolation did not hold. From that first foothold, the agent broke out onto the node running the workload, then harvested cloud and cluster credentials scoped broadly enough to reach multiple internal clusters, all of it inside a single weekend. Hugging Face described the agent framework as executing thousands of individual actions through a swarm of short-lived sandboxes, with self-migrating command-and-control staged on public services. The disclosure adds that the framework appeared to be built on an agentic security-research harness, which would put tooling designed for red-team work behind a live intrusion.

Why the defenders’ queries looked like attacks

Investigators reconstructed more than 17,000 recorded events using AI-driven analysis agents of their own.

First attempts at the log analysis ran on frontier models behind commercial APIs. Defenders’ steps included submitting real attack commands, exploit payloads, and command-and-control artifacts for classification, but safety guardrails blocked the requests outright.

Baer traced the block to the prompts themselves. “The same prompts that are most valuable during an active intrusion, shell commands, exploit chains, credential dumps, persistence mechanisms, lateral movement, are exactly the prompts most likely to trigger safety systems,” she told VentureBeat. “As AI becomes embedded in security operations, this becomes an operational resilience issue rather than merely a model policy issue.”

The forensic analysis finished on GLM 5.2

GLM 5.2, an open-weight model deployed on Hugging Face’s own infrastructure, took the job the commercial APIs refused. No attacker data left the company’s environment. “This experience points to a gap worth planning for,” the company wrote in its disclosure. Hugging Face does not know which model powered the agents. It could have been a jailbroken hosted model or an open-weight model running without restrictions. Either way, the disclosure continued, “the attacker was bound by no usage policy, while our own forensic work was blocked by the guardrails of the hosted models we first tried.” Hugging Face drew that line itself, writing that the experience is not an argument against safety measures on hosted models and that it is sharing the feedback with the providers concerned.

What authenticated trust changes

The industry, Baer argued, needs to move past treating AI safety as a content moderation problem. “Security operations require something different. Authenticated trust.” Instead of asking whether anyone should receive an answer, the question becomes whether an authenticated security team, operating under enterprise controls, should receive it. “The model shouldn’t only understand what is being asked. It should understand who is asking, why, and under what governance.”

“Organizations already build contingency plans for cloud outages, identity provider failures, or EDR failures,” Baer wrote. “AI assistants are becoming another dependency.”

Her advice on IR playbooks was blunt. “A mature incident response plan should assume that during a severe incident, commercial AI APIs may refuse requests, API rate limits may become unavailable, internet connectivity may be impaired, and data governance rules may prohibit uploading forensic evidence externally.” The lesson, she wrote in her emailed answers, “isn’t ‘don’t use commercial models.’ It’s ‘don’t make them a single point of failure.’”

AI-enabled attacks rose 89% year-over-year

Autonomous AI-driven attacks are not limited to AI platforms. CrowdStrike’s 2026 Global Threat Report documented AI-enabled adversary operations increasing by 89% year over year, with average breakout times falling to 29 minutes. Enterprises running AI workloads in production with agentic access to their pipelines face similar exposure.

Six control domains determined the blast radius and recovery speed at Hugging Face. Each one maps to a concrete action security leaders can take before the next autonomous-agent breach arrives.

AI Pipeline Breach Response Playbook

The board question is operational resilience

“The question for directors is simple. What happens if one of our critical security tools becomes unavailable during the exact moment we need it most?” Baer framed that as operational resilience, not AI policy.

She would have boards take that framing straight to management and press for specifics. “Have we actually exercised that fallback during tabletop exercises? How quickly can we switch during an incident?” Procurement needs to change alongside governance, starting with the questions buyers ask. Security teams evaluating AI vendors should ask about their process for authenticated incident responders, whether enterprise customers receive different handling during verified incidents, and whether models can be deployed privately. “Those questions belong alongside uptime, privacy, and compliance,” Baer said.

“The biggest takeaway isn’t that safety guardrails are ‘bad.’ They’re doing what they were designed to do,” she argued.

Her larger point is that the threat model itself has changed. “For decades, defenders had better tools than attackers because they operated inside trusted enterprise environments. With foundation models, both sides increasingly use the same capabilities, but one side is constrained by enterprise governance, policy, compliance, and safety controls, while the adversary simply downloads an uncensored open-weight model and keeps going. That’s a new kind of asymmetry,” she added. “The organizations that handle it best won’t necessarily be the ones with the most powerful AI. They’ll be the ones that architect AI as a resilient security capability rather than a single cloud service.”

Hugging Face has contained the intrusion, rebuilt compromised nodes, rotated credentials, and reported the incident to law enforcement. The company recommends that all users rotate access tokens and review recent account activity. Mid-incident, Hugging Face found out whether its own AI tooling would be available, and the first answer was no. Security leaders running AI in production should find out in incident response planning instead, before an autonomous agent forces the test.

Presented by JumpCloud

The organizations losing confidence in AI are the ones most likely to get it right.

Six months ago, 40% of IT leaders described their organizations as mature in AI deployment. Today that number is 23%. Before you read that as a setback, consider what it actually reflects.

We recently surveyed 800 IT leaders across the U.S. and U.K. for our Q3 2026 trends report, and the data tells a consistent story: the organizations revising their self-assessment downward are overwhelmingly the ones that have moved AI agents from pilots into production. They’re not losing faith in AI. They’re running into the problems that only show up when agents are doing real work in real systems, and they’re being honest about what they found.

That kind of honesty is harder to come by than it sounds, and it matters more than the confidence number itself.

Deployment was the easy part

84% of organizations plan to expand AI use in IT operations over the next 6 to 24 months, so the drop in confidence isn’t a retreat. What it reflects is a more accurate picture of what production actually requires.

In a pilot, an AI agent does one thing in a controlled setting. In production, it accesses real systems, makes decisions that affect real workflows, and operates continuously, often without a human in the loop. The governance infrastructure that entails is materially different from what it took to get the pilot working. Most organizations built enough to ship. Fewer built enough to scale.

The IT leaders revising their self-assessment are confronting questions they didn’t have to ask at the pilot stage: Can we see every agent running in our environment? Do we know what each one can access? If an agent behaved unexpectedly last week, how long would it take to find out? For most organizations, at least one of those answers is uncomfortable.

The gap between perception and reality is where risk accumulates

The graphic above captures the structural problem. Across confidence, governance, and autonomy, the same pattern holds: deployment is moving faster than the controls built around it.

The organizations that have closed this gap share specific characteristics. They’ve consolidated their IT environments rather than adding tools to solve each new problem, because every additional platform creates another place where agent identity, access, and accountability can go unmanaged. They treat AI agents as governed identities rather than tolerated shadow processes. And they measure what AI actually produces, not just what it deploys.

The payoff is tangible. Organizations in the top tier of our maturity model are five times more likely to report no barriers to expanding their AI agents than the average organization. They are not more cautious about AI. They are more confident in it, because they built the foundation that makes confidence earned rather than assumed.

The governance gap has a specific shape

The hardest problem in enterprise AI right now is not capability. It is accountability, and the data makes the specific failure point clear: non-human identity governance is the least adopted AI security practice we measured, in place at just 21% of organizations.

Non-human identities now outnumber human users in 83% of organizations, and that population is growing fast. Yet most of those identities exist without the governance structures that every human employee has as a matter of course: no formal record, no named owner, no defined scope of access, no offboarding process when their purpose expires. They keep running. They keep accessing systems. They keep accumulating permissions. We call these Zombie Agents, and they are the service account problem of the AI era, operating at machine speed and in every department.

The accountability gap is where real risk lives. When a human employee takes an action, there is an implicit accountability chain. When an autonomous agent takes an action, that chain breaks unless it has been deliberately engineered. Most organizations have not yet engineered it, and the gap between the autonomy agents are being granted and the oversight structures in place to manage them is widening every month.

What the confidence drop is actually telling us

When AI maturity confidence was uniformly high across the market, that was worth worrying about. It meant most organizations hadn’t yet run into the hard parts. A selective drop, concentrated among organizations actively running agents in production, means the market is developing a more accurate picture of what AI operations genuinely require.

The organizations recalibrating are doing the work that makes long-term AI adoption possible: building identity infrastructure that covers agents alongside humans and devices, unifying the environments where governance needs to apply, and measuring outcomes rather than just counting deployments. They haven’t lowered their ambitions for AI. They have raised their standards for what it means to run it responsibly.

84% of organizations plan to expand AI use over the next two years. The ones that will do it well are honest enough, right now, to admit what they haven’t yet built.

JumpCloud’s Q3 2026 AI Readiness Research report (n=800 IT leaders, U.S. + U.K.) is available here. The report covers AI agent deployment stages, identity governance gaps, IT unification benchmarks, and budget realism across mid-market and enterprise organizations.

Rajat Bhargava is CEO and Co-founder at JumpCloud.

Sponsored articles are content produced by a company that is either paying for the post or has a business relationship with VentureBeat, and they’re always clearly marked. For more information, contact sales@venturebeat.com.

Capital One on Thursday released VulnHunter, an open-source, agentic AI security tool that scans source code for exploitable vulnerabilities, maps out how an attacker would reach them, and proposes targeted fixes — all before a single line ships to production. The tool, built internally and now available on GitHub under an Apache 2.0 license, is one of the most ambitious attempts by a major financial institution to turn offensive AI capabilities into a public defensive resource.

At a time when security teams are facing a rising tide of new AI threats, Capital One's decision to open-source the tool reflects an effort, according to CISO Chris Nims, to address "an increasingly brief window before sophisticated, next-generation AI attack capabilities become affordable and accessible to virtually every adversary."

Capital One is not simply releasing another vulnerability scanner. VulnHunter introduces what the company calls an "attacker-first forward analysis" — a workflow in which the tool begins at the points where a real adversary would enter a system, such as APIs, network messages, or file uploads, and reasons forward through the application's logic to determine whether an exploit path actually survives the code's existing defenses. Conventional scanners typically work in reverse, flagging a dangerous-looking code pattern and then searching backward for a hypothetical attacker. That approach, security practitioners widely acknowledge, buries engineering teams under avalanches of false positives.

VulnHunter attacks that problem head-on with a second innovation: a built-in "falsification engine" that tries to disprove its own findings before a developer ever sees them. After the tool surfaces a potential vulnerability, a structured reasoning workflow hunts for logical gaps, unsupported assumptions, and conditions that would prevent the attack from succeeding. Only findings the engine fails to rule out reach a human reviewer — and when they do, VulnHunter delivers not just an alert but a full explanation of the exploit path and a proposed code fix ready for engineering review.

The tool currently runs on Anthropic's Claude Opus 4.8 model inside a Claude Code environment, though Capital One says the framework has the potential to work across other foundation models and coding harnesses.

Why Capital One is giving the tool away

Asked why Capital One decided to open-source a tool this consequential, Nims pointed to the communal nature of the problem.

"We felt an imperative to open-source VulnHunter because modern software supply chains are very connected, and the scale of the AI threat is larger than any single organization," Nims told VentureBeat. "Securing software and our digital environments is a shared foundation that benefits developers, enterprises, and the people who depend on the systems we all build. The defensive tools to address this reality need to be just as widely distributed, tested, and improved as the codebases they protect."

"Rather than wait," he added, "we decided that the right response was to build a product that is purpose-fit for today's complex security landscape, and put it into the hands of defenders everywhere."

Why Capital One believes open-sourcing VulnHunter strengthens everyone's defenses

The release nonetheless arrives against a backdrop the company knows well. On July 19, 2019, Capital One disclosed that an outside individual — later identified as a former Amazon Web Services employee named Paige Thompson — had gained unauthorized access to names, addresses, self-reported income, Social Security numbers, and linked bank account numbers belonging to credit card customers and applicants. The breach, which Capital One says occurred on March 22 and 23, 2019, was discovered only after an external security researcher flagged a configuration vulnerability through the company's Responsible Disclosure Program on July 17 of that year.

The damage was sweeping. Approximately 100 million people in the United States and 6 million in Canada were affected. Roughly 140,000 Social Security numbers, about 80,000 linked bank account numbers, and approximately 1 million Canadian Social Insurance Numbers were compromised. The FBI arrested Thompson, and the government stated it believed the data had been recovered with no evidence of fraud. But the reputational and regulatory toll was enormous.

In August 2020, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency fined Capital One $80 million, finding that the bank had failed to adequately identify and manage risks as it migrated significant technology operations to the cloud. As Reuters reported at the time, the OCC's consent order cited insufficient network security controls, inadequate data loss prevention measures, and a board that failed to hold management accountable when internal auditing surfaced problems. The OCC also ordered Capital One to overhaul its operations and submit new cybersecurity plans for regulatory review.

CyberScoop at the time called the incident "a cautionary tale for companies rushing to embrace new tech." Capital One's own CEO, Richard D. Fairbank, acknowledged the gravity of the moment. "While I am grateful that the perpetrator has been caught, I am deeply sorry for what has happened," Fairbank said at the time. "I sincerely apologize for the understandable worry this incident must be causing those affected and I am committed to making it right."

Inside Capital One's decade-long open-source strategy — and what VulnHunter adds to it.

What followed was not a retreat from technology but a doubling down — with security explicitly at the center.

Capital One began releasing open-source projects in 2014 and declared itself an "open-source first" company in 2015 as part of a broader technology transformation that began over a decade ago. The company has continued to invest in software supply chain security, open-source governance, and AI-driven defense. In August 2022, Capital One joined the Open Source Security Foundation as a premier member, earning a seat on the organization's Governing Board. Chris Nims, then EVP of Cloud & Productivity Engineering, framed the move as a natural extension of the company's operating philosophy. "As a highly-regulated company, we are seasoned in managing compliance and governance and advocate for standardization, automation and collaboration," Nims said in the OpenSSF announcement.

Behind that public commitment lay a substantial operational apparatus. Capital One's Open Source Program Office, now in its third iteration, manages open-source usage, contributions, and community building across the enterprise. The company has released more than 40 open-source projects and has made thousands of contributions to external open-source projects it depends on, according to the company. Those efforts address not just code dependencies but the entire software development lifecycle — DevSecOps tools, infrastructure, and the collaborative environments, both internal and external, that shape how software gets built and shipped.

VulnHunter is the most consequential product of that multi-year effort — and the release reflects a calculation increasingly common among large enterprises: that in security, giving away the tool is cheaper than fighting alone. "At the end of the day our goal is to make this product as broadly accessible as possible," Nims said.

The company argues that modern software supply chains are so deeply interconnected that a single vulnerability in a widely used open-source component can cascade across thousands of enterprises simultaneously. Proprietary defenses, no matter how sophisticated, cannot address a problem that is fundamentally communal. By releasing VulnHunter under a permissive license, Capital One invites the global security research community to stress-test, extend, and improve the tool — effectively crowdsourcing its own defense infrastructure while strengthening the broader ecosystem.

Inside VulnHunter's three-stage AI engine for finding exploitable code

For engineering leaders evaluating VulnHunter, the technical architecture is where the tool's ambitions become concrete. The workflow unfolds in three distinct stages.

In the first stage — attacker-first forward analysis — VulnHunter begins at the points where an external adversary would interact with a system: API endpoints, network message handlers, file upload interfaces. From each entry point, the tool reasons forward through application logic, tracing data flows, transformations, and internal security checkpoints to determine whether an attacker can actually reach a dangerous code path. This approach mirrors how a skilled penetration tester would probe a system, but automates the process at a scale no human team could match.

The second stage is where VulnHunter departs most sharply from conventional scanners. After identifying a potential vulnerability, the falsification engine runs a structured reasoning workflow designed to disprove its own conclusion. It searches for assumptions that do not hold, logical gaps in the exploit path, and environmental conditions that would prevent an attack from succeeding. Findings that fail this internal challenge are discarded before any developer sees them. Capital One's explicit goal is to shift the developer's burden away from triaging false alarms — a perennial pain point that erodes trust in security tooling and slows development velocity.

In the third stage, vulnerabilities that survive the falsification engine trigger an evidence-backed remediation workflow. VulnHunter gathers supporting evidence across the codebase, maps the complete surviving exploit path, explains the defect and the specific capabilities an attacker would gain, and generates targeted code changes for engineering review. The output is not a generic advisory but a concrete, context-aware patch proposal.

Capital One says it validated VulnHunter internally before release, running it across thousands of repositories spanning tens of business areas. The company reports that the tool identified and remediated vulnerabilities with speed and efficiency that far exceeded what its teams previously achieved through manual triage.

Why AI-powered attacks are forcing banks to rethink traditional cyber defenses

VulnHunter arrives at a moment when the cybersecurity landscape is shifting beneath the feet of every enterprise. Capital One's announcement frames the urgency in stark terms: advanced AI models have "dramatically lowered the barrier for bad actors to discover and exploit vulnerabilities in software," and the window before sophisticated AI attack capabilities become affordable and accessible to virtually every adversary is shrinking rapidly.

"Safeguarding information is essential to our mission and our role as a financial institution," Nims told VentureBeat. "We have invested heavily in cybersecurity and will continue to do so to stay ahead of today's evolving threat landscape."

The company's own AI security researchers have been tracking these trends closely. At NeurIPS 2024 in Vancouver, Capital One's team presented research and curated a list of nearly 100 papers spanning LLM safety, adversarial resilience, jailbreak attacks, and synthetic data generation. The papers they highlighted — including work on multi-agent defense frameworks, automated red-teaming, and guardrail classifiers — paint a picture of an arms race in which offensive and defensive AI capabilities are co-evolving at breakneck speed.

Several of those research themes map directly onto VulnHunter's architecture. The falsification engine echoes the adversarial defense strategies explored in papers like "BackdoorAlign," which demonstrated that embedding a structured safety mechanism into a small number of training examples could recover a model's safety alignment without degrading performance. The attacker-first forward analysis reflects the philosophy of "WildTeaming," a framework that collects and analyzes real-world jailbreak attempts to build more resilient models. And VulnHunter's emphasis on minimizing false positives parallels the goals of "GuardFormer," a guardrail classifier that outperformed GPT-4 on safety benchmarks while running 14 times faster.

The thread connecting all of this work is a conviction that traditional, reactive security — monitoring networks, patching known vulnerabilities, responding to incidents after they occur — is no longer sufficient when adversaries can use AI to discover and exploit zero-day vulnerabilities at machine speed. The only durable defense, Capital One argues, is to find and fix the vulnerabilities in your own code before attackers find them first.

What Capital One's cloud security journey reveals about the entire banking industry

Capital One's cloud journey also illuminates a broader reckoning across financial services. When Capital One moved aggressively to Amazon Web Services in the mid-2010s, it was a rarity among major banks. Most financial institutions simply did not trust third parties to store their most sensitive data. Capital One's CIO at the time, Rob Alexander, publicly championed the cloud as more secure than the bank's own data centers — a claim that the 2019 breach complicated considerably.

The CyberScoop report from that period captured the tension within the industry. W. Patrick Opet, managing director of cybersecurity at JP Morgan Chase, described a cultural shift in banking from prioritizing traders to prioritizing developers: "Now, it's 'Focus on the developer, turn everything into code, and automate everything.'" Mark Nicholson, Deloitte's cyber leader for the financial industry, noted that the pressure to move quickly was exposing "weaknesses in the development methodology." And the breach itself was a reminder that even as Chase spent $600 million annually on cybersecurity, relatively simple vulnerabilities — like the Apache Struts bug that enabled the Equifax breach — could undercut massive investments in data protection.

Seven years later, the industry has largely followed Capital One into the cloud, and the security challenges have only intensified. The question is no longer whether to use cloud infrastructure but how to secure the software that runs on it. VulnHunter represents part of Capital One's answer to that question: rather than relying solely on network-level controls and perimeter defenses, push security directly into the code itself, at the moment it is written. The open-source release also carries implicit competitive pressure. If VulnHunter gains traction among developers and security teams, it could set a new baseline for what enterprise security tooling is expected to do — and force rival banks, fintechs, and cloud providers to match or exceed its capabilities.

Whether VulnHunter lives up to that ambition will depend on adoption, community engagement, and the tool's real-world performance against the increasingly sophisticated AI-powered attacks it was designed to counter. But the release itself tells a story that extends well beyond any single tool or any single company. In 2019, a misconfigured web application firewall — exploited alongside an overly permissive cloud access role — exposed the records of roughly 100 million Americans, drew an $80 million regulatory fine, and became one of the most widely cited cloud security incidents in the industry.

In 2026, the same institution is open-sourcing an AI-driven defense built for a new generation of threats — and betting that the best way to protect its own code is to help the entire industry protect theirs.

Presented by Ping Identity

Enterprises need to treat zero trust security architecture as an immediate requirement for AI agents rather than a long-term goal, says Andre Durand, CEO and founder of Ping Identity. Zero trust, the security model built on the assumption that no user, device, or system should be automatically trusted, requires continuous verification before every action rather than a single check at login. Agentic AI has profoundly compressed the risk timeline enterprises must manage, demanding that permission decisions be evaluated in real time.

type: embedded-entry-inline id: 1Ieiy1KhHNWZE5KVqNdA1G

That compression shows up in how permissions accumulate. Every time an employee approves an AI agent's request for access to a company drive, a database, or a code repository, the enterprise hands over a sliver of control that looks routine in isolation. Across thousands of agents making thousands of requests, those approvals accumulate into an exposure that most existing security architectures were never built to measure.

"The rise in desire to use agents right now, and the speed of agentic, is highlighting the need to move faster on the principles of zero trust," Durand says. "Agents just move faster, full stop. A human compromise might be measured in minutes or hours, sometimes days. At agentic speed, a thousand actions could happen in five minutes."

Why zero trust is now urgent for agentic AI

That difference in velocity changes how enterprises need to think about permissions. Two variables matter: the surface area of access an agent is granted and the duration that access remains valid. Traditional identity and access management tends to grant broad permissions and leave sessions open for extended periods because the human using them moves at human speed. Zero trust, in contrast, collapses both variables at once by narrowing access down to what is strictly necessary and revalidating it continuously, rather than once at login.

"Zero trust really just says, just enough, just in time," Durand says. "It's your next action that we care about. We're moving identity from an era where access was our runtime control point — meaning were you logged in, did you have a session — toward the decision that sits behind that login."

Why agents must be treated as first-class identities

That shift to decision-based control has direct implications for how agents should be provisioned in the first place. The common practice of letting an agent operate under a cloned human login or a shared service account doesn't work, Durand says.

"Each agent should have its own identity," he explains. "It should not be impersonating the human. It can act on behalf of the human, we could explicitly delegate authority to an agent, but we don't want to blur the lines between the human taking action and the agent taking action."

And beyond that is another concern: the shared secrets, API keys in particular, that many service accounts still rely on. For example, the habit of embedding keys directly in source code, where they can be committed accidentally and exposed, is a convenient but weak security pattern that agentic workflows make considerably riskier. Building service account architectures that let agents authenticate without relying on those shared credentials or other long-lived standing access is now an urgent priority rather than a long-term cleanup project.

Where enterprises can enforce zero trust policies

Enforcing any of this in practice requires identifying where policy can actually be applied. Several existing choke points, including API gateways and the agent gateway sitting in front of MCP servers, offer practical locations where enterprises can inspect what an agent is requesting and apply policy rules before granting it.

"Those policies could leverage real-time risk and fraud signals, and then enforce, deterministically, what the agent can do when it interacts with these systems," Durand explains.

The goal is to move authorization from something decided once at login to something evaluated at the moment of every consequential action, such as an agent attempting to commit code to a repository. Instead of carrying a standing permission to write to GitHub, the agent's request would be checked against context and policy at that specific moment, closing the window of trust down to the scope of a single action.

Stopping AI agents from rewriting their own permissions

That model becomes especially important given how agents can behave once they are already inside a system — for example, coding agents that have acknowledged, when questioned, either ignoring a specific guardrail entirely, or attempting to rewrite the permissions they were given.

"Who's watching the watcher? Zero trust needs to apply here," Durand says. "If generative AI systems follow your instruction 97% of the time, and you're simply asking it for advice, that might be fine. If it's responsible for making a decision about who gets let in, 97% is not good enough."

How to trust AI-generated output at agent speed

The answer to that gap is not to eliminate AI from the review process, but to structure reviews so no single agent’s judgment is taken at face value. Because human review cannot scale to the volume and speed of agentic output without erasing the advantage of using agents at all, a new framework is necessary, so that when one agent produces work, such as code, separate agents evaluate it, provided those reviewing agents are kept from communicating with one another or with the one they are checking. It's a new human-AI paradigm, Durand says.

"We probably will have to develop frameworks that we trust without seeing or verifying the output directly," he explains. "It's not that that construct is 100% foolproof. However, it's the best we can do to move at agent speed. We can't trust the exact output, but we can trust the framework."

In practice, that means combining automated review with clear human accountability for higher-risk decisions, rather than treating agent output as self-validating.

For traditional auditors, reviewing every transaction individually is never feasible, and statistically valid sampling stands in for full verification. The same applies to risk accumulation: a single agent action might carry little risk on its own, while a sequence of actions moving in a consistent direction could cross a threshold that triggers an intervention, including a kill switch capable of halting the agent before further harm occurs.

What to ask when evaluating agentic identity platforms

For security leaders evaluating identity platforms for agentic AI, there's no narrow checklist. Enterprises should evaluate what their full lifecycle of agent management looks like. Most enterprises are managing agents on two fronts simultaneously: customer-facing agents acting on behalf of external users, and internal agents deployed to automate enterprise processes.

"Pause long enough to see the totality of what it would mean to secure multiple agents, both interacting with you from the outside as well as being deployed on the inside," Durand says. "We need discovery and visibility of all the agents operating within our estate, a place to register them, a standard way to assign custodians, and a way to construct and centralize policy so security can enforce it across the organization."

And while basic security principles were already fully understood before agentic AI arrived, what has changed, Durand says, is that the cost of moving slowly has finally caught up with the cost of moving carelessly, giving enterprises a narrowing window to build the right architecture before widespread agentic adoption makes retrofitting far more expensive.

Sponsored articles are content produced by a company that is either paying for the post or has a business relationship with VentureBeat, and they’re always clearly marked. For more information, contact sales@venturebeat.com.

1Password on Tuesday launched AI Spend and Consumption Management, a new capability embedded in its SaaS Manager platform that gives IT and finance teams a unified, real-time view of how their organizations consume and spend on AI services from vendors including Anthropic, Cursor, and OpenAI.

The move marks the latest strategic expansion for a company that built its reputation on password management for consumers and, over the past three years, has aggressively repositioned itself as a broader identity security and SaaS governance platform for enterprise buyers. With this release, 1Password is staking a claim in one of enterprise technology's newest and most chaotic budget categories: the consumption-based cost of large language models.

"Executives want teams to build faster with AI, but that speed is creating a new kind of spending pressure," Greg Henry, 1Password's chief financial officer, said in an exclusive interview with VentureBeat. "Developers are consuming tokens at a pace that traditional budgets weren't built to manage, and IT and finance teams are being asked to forecast and justify AI investments without a clear view of what's actually driving costs."

The product, now in public preview with broad availability planned for fall 2026, connects directly to vendor admin APIs to pull token-level consumption data daily. It normalizes that data across providers into a single dashboard and allows organizations to set vendor-level spend limits, configure threshold-based alerts via Slack and email, and break down usage by team, user, vendor, and model.

Why traditional software budgets can't keep up with AI token pricing

The core challenge 1Password is targeting is structural. Traditional SaaS pricing operates on a per-seat, per-year model that is easy to budget and reconcile. AI pricing does not. Every API call to Claude, GPT-5.6, or a Cursor-powered coding assistant consumes tokens, and the cost of those tokens varies by model, by input versus output, and by the complexity of the task. A single engineering team running agentic workflows can burn through a prepaid token budget in weeks — and the finance team may not notice until the invoice arrives.

Henry drew a sharp analogy to a problem enterprises have already lived through once. "Consumption-based pricing isn't new," he said. "We saw it arrive with cloud infrastructure, and it took years to build the tools and disciplines to manage it. AI is the next version of that shift."

That comparison resonates across the industry. When Amazon Web Services, Microsoft Azure, and Google Cloud popularized consumption-based pricing for compute and storage in the 2010s, enterprises initially lacked the tooling to monitor and optimize their cloud bills. That gap spawned an entire FinOps ecosystem — companies like CloudHealth, Spot.io, and Apptio built multi-billion-dollar businesses helping organizations understand what they were spending on cloud and why. Henry is explicitly betting that AI token spend will follow the same trajectory, and that organizations that fail to build visibility now will end up, as he put it, "paying far more than they needed to, for far longer than they should have."

The scale of the coming wave lends credibility to that bet. Goldman Sachs has estimated that token consumption from AI agents alone will grow 24 times by 2030, a projection driven by the expectation that autonomous AI systems will increasingly execute multi-step workflows — booking travel, writing and deploying code, managing customer service interactions — that generate vastly more API calls than a human sitting at a chat interface.

How 1Password's new dashboard tracks every token across Anthropic, Cursor, and OpenAI

The new capability extends 1Password SaaS Manager's existing foundation of application discovery, license management, and spend analytics. It is not a standalone product. Existing SaaS Manager customers can activate it by connecting their supported AI vendor API keys, at which point consumption data flows into a dedicated AI Consumption Management dashboard. Henry confirmed that there is no separate product or add-on fee: "AI Spend and Consumption Management is available to all 1Password SaaS Manager customers."

The system provides four core functions. First, it aggregates token usage and spend across Anthropic, Cursor, and OpenAI into a single, normalized view — eliminating the need to toggle between three separate vendor dashboards with three different reporting formats. Second, it enables budget controls: organizations can set vendor-level spend limits, configure percentage-based thresholds, and receive automated alerts when prepaid balances approach depletion. Third, it disaggregates consumption by team, user, vendor, and model, allowing finance and IT to understand not just how much is being spent, but where and by whom. Fourth, it situates AI spend within the broader SaaS portfolio, helping organizations see how token costs relate to their total software investment.

Notably, the system captures consumption regardless of whether a human or an AI agent generated it. "Token consumption is captured at the API level regardless of whether a human or an agent is generating it," Henry explained. "Organizations get the total consumption picture, including the spikes that agent loops can create, which can be some of the hardest usage to catch before it becomes a problem."

That agent-level visibility matters because autonomous AI systems can generate runaway costs in ways that human users typically cannot. An agentic coding assistant stuck in a retry loop, for example, can consume thousands of dollars in tokens in minutes — with no human in the loop to notice. For now, the product alerts but does not enforce. When asked whether 1Password will eventually give organizations the ability to automatically cut off spending when a threshold is crossed, Henry said the company is "actively evaluating" automatic enforcement but emphasized that visibility must come first: "You can't enforce what you can't see."

The choice of launch partners reveals where enterprise AI budgets are under the most pressure

The decision to start with Anthropic, Cursor, and OpenAI — rather than casting a wider net — reflects where enterprise AI adoption and budget strain are most concentrated right now. Henry said the choice was driven entirely by customer demand. "Anthropic, Cursor, and OpenAI are where we're seeing the highest adoption, and where token consumption can move fast and get ahead of the teams responsible for managing it," he said. The company plans to add additional vendors based on customer demand, API availability, and budget impact, though it has not committed to a specific timeline or vendor list.

The inclusion of Cursor alongside the two major foundation model providers is telling. Cursor, an AI-powered code editor that has rapidly gained traction among developers, represents a category of AI tool where consumption is particularly difficult to forecast. Unlike a chatbot interface where a user consciously types a prompt, Cursor integrates AI suggestions directly into the development workflow, generating token consumption continuously as developers write code. That ambient, always-on consumption pattern makes it especially prone to budget overruns.

Henry also addressed who inside an organization should actually own this problem — and acknowledged that the honest answer right now is no one. "When spend is fragmented across vendor dashboards and finance teams are reconciling it monthly, you're always behind," he said. "AI spend can't be treated as a finance-only or IT-only problem." He noted that the pricing differences between models have become significant enough that the choice of which AI model a team uses is now a meaningful financial decision, one that is pulling CFOs into conversations with IT, product, and engineering leaders "in ways they never had to before."

Steve May, director of IT at ServiceTrade, a 1Password customer that has been using the capability, said it addressed a concrete planning gap. "Forecasting tools for AI consumption and spend was one of our biggest gaps in planning because we didn't have a reliable way to track it," May said. He added that the visibility has "prevented overages that would have cost far more to fix after the fact."

Where 1Password fits in the fast-consolidating SaaS management market

1Password is not the only company racing to solve the AI cost management problem, but the competitive landscape is still fragmented and the category is far from mature.

Zylo, a SaaS management platform that Gartner has also recognized as a leader in the space, published its 2026 SaaS Management Index in January showing that AI-native application spend surged 393% year over year in organizations with more than 10,000 employees and 108% overall. Zylo's data also revealed that ChatGPT has become the most expensed application in enterprise environments, highlighting how AI tools are entering organizations through employee credit cards and expense reports — outside formal procurement and governance workflows. Zylo has added its own token-level cost tracking for AI vendors including Anthropic, OpenAI, Cursor, and Perplexity.

Meanwhile, according to a comparison published by Coommit in May, Vendr — which focuses more on SaaS negotiation than discovery — tracks AI tools at the contract level but does not yet offer consumption-level visibility. And the FinOps Foundation reported in its 2026 State of FinOps survey that 98% of organizations now actively manage AI costs, up from just 31% in 2024. The broader SaaS management market is also consolidating rapidly. In May, Deel acquired Sastrify, a German SaaS management vendor, and began folding it into its HR platform — a signal that SaaS management capabilities are increasingly being absorbed into adjacent enterprise platforms rather than remaining standalone products.

1Password's approach differs from pure-play SaaS management competitors in one important respect: it is building AI cost management on top of an identity security platform, not a FinOps or procurement tool. The company's SaaS Manager product grew out of its 2025 acquisition of Trelica, a UK-based SaaS access management startup whose technology enabled the discovery of unsanctioned applications — so-called shadow IT. As BetaKit reported at the time of that deal, 1Password co-CEO Jeff Shiner described Trelica as "a pioneer in modern SaaS access management" and said the acquisition would accelerate 1Password's Extended Access Management product roadmap by more than a year. CRN noted that Trelica brought more than 300 SaaS integrations to the platform. That identity-first lineage gives 1Password a natural advantage in connecting spend data to specific users and teams — a linkage that matters when the question shifts from "how much are we spending on AI?" to "who is spending it, and is it delivering value?"

From password manager to platform company: 1Password's $6.8 billion bet on enterprise identity

The launch raises a question that Henry addressed head-on: whether a company that started as a consumer password manager can credibly compete in enterprise AI cost management.

"It doesn't feel like a stretch to us. It feels like a natural progression," he said. "For more than 20 years, 1Password has evolved alongside how our customers work. We started by protecting passwords. Then we helped organizations manage secrets, control access, and get visibility into the applications their teams rely on."

The company's evolution has been rapid. 1Password raised a $620 million Series C in January 2022 led by ICONIQ Growth, reaching a $6.8 billion valuation — at the time, the largest funding round ever raised by a Canadian company, according to Crunchbase. The round also attracted celebrity investors including Ryan Reynolds, Scarlett Johansson, and Robert Downey Jr. As of early 2025, BetaKit reported that 1Password had surpassed $250 million in annual recurring revenue, with B2B sales accounting for nearly three-quarters of total revenue and the company claiming to be cash-flow positive.

In May 2024, 1Password launched Extended Access Management, a platform designed to secure sign-ins across both managed and unmanaged applications and devices. That same year, it acquired Kolide for device trust and, in early 2025, Trelica for SaaS discovery. In June 2026, Gartner named 1Password a Leader in its Magic Quadrant for SaaS Management Platforms. According to 1Password's own blog post on the recognition, its SaaS Manager now supports over 400 integrations and provides visibility into a library of more than 40,000 pre-populated application profiles. Each step has moved the company further from its consumer roots and deeper into enterprise infrastructure. The AI Spend and Consumption Management launch extends that trajectory into financial operations territory — a domain where 1Password will compete not only with SaaS management vendors but potentially with dedicated FinOps platforms and the AI vendors' own billing dashboards.

Why high AI token consumption doesn't always mean wasted money

Perhaps the most revealing part of Henry's commentary concerns what organizations should actually do with the consumption data once they have it. He pushed back forcefully against the assumption that high token consumption automatically signals waste.

"A team burning through tokens may be building something genuinely valuable," he said. "A lower-usage project might not be moving the business forward at all. What matters is whether that consumption is producing enough business value to justify the spend."

Henry drew a distinction between personal productivity — "having a bot summarize your meeting or draft a quick email" — and genuine business outcomes. "What organizations need to see is where consumption is actually driving revenue, efficiency, or something that moves the needle."

That framing positions AI Spend and Consumption Management not just as a cost-cutting tool but as a decision-support system for AI investment allocation. If a CFO can see that one engineering team's heavy Claude usage is powering a product feature that drives revenue, while another team's OpenAI spend is funding low-value internal automation, the organization can reallocate budget accordingly rather than imposing across-the-board cuts.

"When costs rise faster than expected, the instinct is to cut," Henry said. "But most organizations can't yet tell which teams, models, or tools are responsible for the increase, so they end up cutting across the board rather than directing investment toward the AI projects that are actually delivering business value. Blunt cuts on a technology you're counting on for competitive advantage is not a management strategy, it's a missed opportunity."

The next enterprise budget crisis is already here — and it's priced per token

The product's current scope — three vendor integrations, alerting but not enforcement — is clearly a starting point. Henry signaled that automatic spend limits are on the roadmap and that additional vendor integrations will follow based on customer demand.

But the broader trajectory he described suggests 1Password sees this launch as a wedge into a much larger opportunity. "As traditional SaaS products add AI capabilities, their pricing models are going to follow," he said. "Organizations that build visibility and management discipline around consumption now are going to be in a much better position when that happens across the rest of their software portfolio."

If Henry is right, the chaos currently confined to AI token budgets is not a temporary growing pain but a preview of how all enterprise software will eventually be priced. A decade ago, companies scrambled to understand their cloud bills. Today, they are scrambling to understand their AI bills. The question is whether the organizations building the dashboards this time around can get ahead of the curve — or whether, as Henry warned, they will end up where so many companies ended up with cloud, realizing too late how much they were overpaying, and for how long.

AI Spend and Consumption Management is available now in public preview for 1Password SaaS Manager customers. Broad availability is planned for fall 2026.

Slopsquatting represents an emerging supply chain threat made possible by AI hallucinations. As developers increasingly rely on AI coding assistants, they unknowingly grant cybercriminals access to their software from day one. 

Understanding what slopsquatting is

Slopsquatting is a new type of supply chain attack that uses large language model (LLM) hallucinations to inject malicious code into development workflows. The term combines "AI slop" and "typosquatting," a deceptive practice where attackers register misspelled or lookalike versions of popular domains to prey on users who enter URLs incorrectly.

This novel attack vector exploits LLMs' tendency to generate fictitious software package names, which threat actors can then register and populate with malicious code.

During AI-assisted coding, the model may generate fake open-source packages — bundled collections of files, programs and installation tools. This alone is not necessarily harmful. However, if an attacker registers that fake package name, they can inject malware that gets incorporated directly into a developer's codebase.

How AI creates a supply chain risk

Traditionally, AI safety risks stem from hallucinations, which can adversely affect users who treat misinformation as valid. However, those same hallucinations have evolved into exploitable security vulnerabilities.

Typosquatting is a deceptive practice where a cybercriminal registers a mispelled version of a popular package to trick developers. It has existed for decades, so registries have built protections against it. 

However, AI has changed the threat model. It recommends fictitious packages that sound plausible rather than making simple misspellings. Once attackers learn which hallucinated packages models tend to invent, they can register malware-filled packages under those names.

Since the hallucinated packages are not simply typoed versions of popular libraries, there are no protections against this practice at scale. For example, the registry protects against an attacker publishing "crossenv," a squat of the popular "cross-env" package. However, it would not identify "mpn install cross-env file" or "cross-env-extended" as threats.

Hallucinations are persistent and severe

Even if many LLMs recommend the same hallucinated package, widespread compromise is still possible. Malicious packages could remain undetected in production for months or even years, allowing threat actors to passively inject malware across countless environments. 

One research team analyzed 31,267 vulnerabilities belonging to 14,675 packages across 10 programming languages. They discovered that reported vulnerabilities are increasing at an annual rate of 98%, faster growth than the 25% annual increase in the number of open-source software packages. The team also observed an 85% increase in the average lifespan of vulnerabilities, indicating a decline in security.

Real-world dangers of AI hallucinations

Malicious actors can create open-access packages under the same name as commonly hallucinated libraries. Instead of standard code, they are filled with malware. The models believe they are referring to existing packages, so they often repeat the same hallucinated names. Since the hallucinations are not random, attackers could theoretically register packages that trick tens of thousands of developers.

These packages appear legitimate. String similarity to real libraries makes them recognizable. One-character typos suggest simple mistakes rather than malicious intent. Even fully fabricated names remain believable when the AI presents them in proper context. Detection is challenging, as developers trust their coding assistants to recommend valid dependencies.

Why are LLMs hallucinating packages?

LLMs generate the statistically most likely answer rather than prioritizing accuracy. Hallucinations are relatively common as a result. One study found hallucination rates range from 50% to 82%, depending on the model and prompting method. Even GPT-4o, the best-performing model, goes no lower than 23%, even with prompt-based mitigation.

Adversarial hallucination attacks could worsen this problem. Threat actors can leverage token-level manipulation or retrieval poisoning to force models to hallucinate in ways they want, increasing the likelihood that models recommend their malicious packages.

Which LLMs are prone to slopsquatting?

While all LLMs are prone to slopsquatting, some are more vulnerable than others. The likelihood of producing hallucinated packages during code generation depends on the model. Proprietary models are four times less likely to generate hallucinated packages than open-source models.

One research group proved this by conducting 30 tests across 30 different systems. Out of the 576,000 code samples and 2.23 million packages it produced, 19.7% were hallucinations. GPT-4.0 Turbo had a hallucination rate of 3.59%, while DeepSeek 1B, the best-performing open-source model, reached 13.63%.

This research suggests that organizations relying on open-source AI tools for code generation are roughly four times more exposed to slopsquatting attacks. That doesn’t necessarily mean proprietary tools will always remain safer, though. Once attackers realize this disparity, they may manipulate proprietary LLMs to take advantage of perceived safety.

Vibe coding contributes to the problem

Software developers who use AI tools estimate that over 40 percent of the code they commit includes AI assistance. They expect that percentage will increase considerably within the next few years. Already, 72% of those who have tried AI use it daily.

The uptick in vibe coding and AI-assisted coding amplifies the threat surface. As more developers integrate AI tools into their workflows without implementing proper verification processes, the attack surface for slopsquatting continues to expand.

For those using AI to assist with coding, double-checking output is essential. Verifying that recommended packages actually exist in official repositories before incorporating them into projects reduces risk.

Navigating AI-assisted development

Implementing automated checks that validate package names against known registries can help catch hallucinated packages before they enter production code. Security teams should also monitor for unusual package installations and maintain up-to-date threat intelligence on known slopsquatting campaigns.

Zac Amos is the Features Editor at ReHack.

Share one API key across five AI agents, and a single compromised agent inherits the reach of all five. The attacker immediately benefits from the accumulated permissions of every workflow that the key touches. The forensic trail goes cold at the credential level because five agents on one account leave no record of which agent did what.

Sixty-nine percent of enterprises run agents with credential sharing somewhere in their deployments, according to VentureBeat’s June 2026 Pulse Research wave of 107 enterprises.

That one number explains the buying spree reshaping enterprise security this year. Palo Alto Networks, CrowdStrike, and Cisco have collectively bet more than $22 billion on it in the past year, targeting exactly the layer most enterprises in this survey haven't finished building.

Palo Alto Networks completed its acquisition of CyberArk on February 11 for $21.1 billion in total consideration at close — a deal it announced last July at roughly $25 billion and the largest in the company's history.

CrowdStrike closed its $740 million acquisition of runtime authorization platform SGNL and, by June 15, shipped the first product from the deal, Continuous Identity for AI Agents. CrowdStrike integrated SGNL in less than a year, delivering a product that validates every agent action in real time based on who owns it, who is calling it, and the device's risk posture.

Cisco announced its intent to acquire non-human identity specialist Astrix Security on May 4 for a reported $400 million.

For a security director, this survey reads as a board-level question, not a trend line. It also surfaces a finding no competitor’s data shows, one that exposes which companies are the most at risk.

The data below is the first look at VentureBeat’s Q2 Agentic Security report, drawn from 107 qualified respondents at organizations with more than 100 employees. The full report will be released to attendees at VB Transform, the event in Menlo Park next week (July 14-15) focusing on enterprise autonomous agents.

Forty-five percent are final decision-makers for AI purchases. The sample skews mid-market, so read the numbers as the view from organizations adopting agent security right now rather than from the largest enterprises.

More than half of respondents, 54%, have already had an agent security incident or near-incident. Eighteen percent confirmed an incident, and thirty-six percent caught a near-miss before a breach. Security teams are stopping most of these events at the last control point in the chain, but the rest of the data shows how thin that margin is.

Your agents are sharing credentials

Only 32% of enterprises give every AI agent its own scoped, managed identity. Nearly half (48%) report that some agents have scoped identities, while many still share credentials. Another 32% say agents mostly run on shared API keys or borrowed human and service-account credentials. The survey question allowed more than one selection, and 24 of the 107 respondents chose multiple options — which is why the three categories sum to 112%. Deduplicated by respondent, 74 organizations, or 69%, flagged credential sharing in at least one answer.

One number explains why the acquisitions target this layer. A shared credential converts a single compromised agent into many, and CyberArk's research puts machine identities at 82 for every human in organizations worldwide, with agents as the fastest-growing category of the ratio. Cisco made the same diagnosis when it bought Astrix, whose founders built the company around API keys, service accounts, and OAuth tokens. Cisco’s announcement calls those the credentials AI agents are now “using (and abusing)” to execute work at scale.

Adam Meyers, senior vice president of counter adversary operations at CrowdStrike, described the mechanism directly in an interview with VentureBeat. Some AI systems have their own identities, he said, and in other cases “people give their identity to the AI to take action on their behalf, and that also further kind of murkies the water and makes it very complex.” The murk is the point, because when the identity is shared, attribution dies with it.

Exposure scales with size, and containment does not

Forty-nine percent of enterprises enforce scoped permissions at runtime, and 47% monitor and log agent activity, which can help reduce security incidents. Only 30% sandbox their highest-risk agents, the one control that limits blast radius when the first two fail. Isolation is what keeps a single compromised agent from becoming a deployment-wide event. Enterprises have funded detection and resistance, but the containment layer barely exists.

The sharpest finding in the survey, and the one no vendor report captures, shows up when you split results by company size. The incident rate is 49% for companies with 101 to 1,000 employees, but it shoots up to 63% for companies with more than 1,000. Sandbox isolation moves the other way, falling from 35% to 20% at the larger companies.

The chart above shows the same finding at finer granularity: the 49%/63% split above is a binary cut at 1,000 employees, while the bars here break incident rate and isolation rate into four size bands. The red line measures incidents and near-misses, and the navy tracks the one control that contains damage after everything else fails. At organizations with 101 to 250 employees, the two sit 7 points apart, but above 5,000, the gap blows out to 60 points. That top band pools the survey's two largest size groups and holds only 15 respondents, so treat the number as directional. Larger enterprises run more agents across more systems, which drives incidents up while sandboxing, the engineering project that would contain them, goes unfunded. The enterprises with the most agents have the least isolation around them.

The deals target exactly those accounts. Palo Alto Networks, Cisco, and CrowdStrike sell to large enterprises first, where incident rates are highest and containment is the thinnest.

Guarded by whoever shipped the model

The model providers are the security layer. OpenAI's built-in guardrails lead at 51%. Google Cloud reaches 36%, Microsoft Azure's Purview and Copilot Studio DLP 35%, and Anthropic's managed-agent controls 29%. Eighty-two percent of respondents name a provider-native or hyperscaler control as their single primary agent security layer.

The purpose-built specialists are in single digits, with Palo Alto Networks' Prisma AIRS at 7%, CrowdStrike at 6%, and Okta for AI Agents at 4%. Zenity and the dedicated non-human identity platforms are at 3% each. Microsoft Entra Agent ID is the highest-penetration identity-specific control in the dataset at 13%, the only one from a hyperscaler, and it still falls outside the top four. Only 5% of enterprises run no dedicated agent tooling at all, and the rest have tooling that came pre-installed.

Bundled controls lead because they ship free and are enabled by default. Most filter prompts and outputs, but they do not give an agent its own identity or sandbox it. Hyperscalers sell identity-layer products, and Entra Agent ID is in the dataset at 13%, but adoption stays low. The two controls that reward incident data the most, scoped identity and isolation, are the two that the default stack does not include.

Prompt-and-output filters evaluate whether a call looks malicious. That is an intent problem, and intent cannot be solved at the language layer. CrowdStrike CTO Elia Zaitsev drew the line in an interview at RSAC 2026. "Observing actual kinetic actions is a structured, solvable problem," Zaitsev said. "Intent is not." CrowdStrike's Falcon sensor walks the process tree on an endpoint and tracks what agents did, not what agents appeared to intend. A scoped identity and an isolation boundary give that sensor something to track, while a shared credential on a bundled guardrail does not.

Cloud security went through the same cycle a decade ago, and Palo Alto Networks, CrowdStrike, and Wiz built multi-billion-dollar businesses on the gaps native cloud controls left open. Agent security is tracking the same path faster. A misconfigured storage bucket sat open until a human noticed. A misconfigured agent exploits its own over-permissioning on every run, and no human is watching when it does. Merritt Baer, chief security officer at Enkrypt AI and a former deputy CISO at AWS, told VentureBeat that the default layer is thinner than enterprises assume. "Enterprises believe they've 'approved' AI vendors, but what they've actually approved is an interface, not the underlying system," Baer said. "The real dependencies are one or two layers deeper, and those are the ones that fail under stress."

Comfortable, unconvinced, and already shopping

Here is the contradiction worth a keynote slide. Enterprises rate their agent security tooling 4.2 out of 5, with value for money at 4.1 and ease of implementation at 3.9. Those scores would make most SaaS vendors envious.

Only 35% believe their AI-enabled defenses are ahead of AI-enabled attackers, while thirty-two percent call it roughly even. Twenty-one percent say attackers lead, and another 21% say it is too early to tell, showing how enterprises trust their tooling more than they trust its outcomes.

Budgets confirm it. Forty-six percent allocate 6 to 10% of the security budget to agent security, and a full third spend 5% or less. Half the sample has already had an incident or near-miss, but the funding does not match the exposure.

Fifty-nine percent plan to adopt, add, or replace agent security tooling within 12 months, and twenty-nine percent plan to move this quarter. OpenAI leads forward interest at 34%, followed by Google at 30%, Anthropic at 29%, and Azure at 25%. The dedicated vendors draw more interest looking forward than their current single-digit footprint suggests. Satisfied customers do not reshuffle this fast unless they know the stack they're currently using is provisional.

Three moves for security directors

1. Inventory every agent’s credentials this quarter. Map which agents share credentials with other agents and which run on borrowed human or service-account identities. The goal is not one credential per agent. Agents that touch multiple systems need multiple scoped identities. The goal is zero shared credentials between agents and zero borrowed human identities. Thirteen percent of surveyed enterprises already run Microsoft Entra Agent ID. Okta for AI Agents and the non-human identity specialists sell equivalents. Shared and borrowed credentials are the first thing to eliminate.

2. Sandbox the riskiest agents first. Isolation is the least-adopted control at 30% and the only one that contains blast radius after prevention fails. Rank agents by the sensitivity of what they touch and isolate the top of the list. Above 1,000 employees, where isolation falls to 20%, this is the single highest-return move in the dataset. Sandboxing does not require replacing the agent or the platform. It requires a policy decision and an isolation layer.

3. Match the budget to the incident rate. A third of enterprises fund agent security at 5% or less of the security budget, even though more than half have already had an incident or near-miss. Nine percent allocate more than 25% today. The full report breaks out exposure and containment by company size, showing which bands carry the most risk and the least protection.

The board's question is simpler. If one of our AI agents was compromised this afternoon, which systems did it touch, and whose credentials was it holding? For the 69% of enterprises running agents on shared credentials, the answer is a shrug. The trail goes cold at the key.

The full Q2 Agentic Security report, with the complete vendor matrix, industry cuts, and the full dataset behind these charts, debuts July 14 and 15 at VB Transform, held at Hotel Nia in Menlo Park. The open question it leaves is whether enterprises close the agent security gap on their own terms, or whether a confirmed breach closes it for them.

Presented by Rubrik

Enterprise cybersecurity is facing a fundamental speed problem. Frontier AI models are now enabling autonomous attacks that can move from initial access to full system breakout in as little as 27 seconds. That’s faster than any human-operated security workflow can detect, escalate, and respond.

As a result, security operations can no longer assume there is time for humans to respond between breach and damage.

The security posture that enterprises need for the AI era centers on cyber resilience: continuously identifying clean recovery states, mapping critical data and identity dependencies, and automating restoration so that operations can recover in hours not days.

"Everything that relied on process or human-in-the-loop intervention is no longer going to be able to execute at the speed of the attacks," says Dev Rishi, GM of AI at Rubrik. "If the attacks are happening in 27 seconds, it means I need my recovery to happen just as quickly."

Traditional detection and prevention are failing against AI-driven attacks

The rules-based logic that has defined enterprise security for decades, such as static access controls, known signature detection and deterministic behavioral policies, was engineered for deterministic software. AI agents behave differently. They're non-deterministic, capable of pursuing the same objective through many different paths, and increasingly capable of circumventing static guardrails by finding alternative routes when one is blocked.

The deeper problem is that conventional security logic checks identity, permissions, and access, and asks whether each individual access is permitted. But it can’t evaluate whether a sequence of permitted actions, taken across multiple applications, constitutes either a data leak, a destructive operation, or an attack.

"You need a system that can understand context," Rishi says. "You need to use AI to look at what an agent is doing and say, ‘it looks like what you're doing might be a risk of leaking sensitive data externally.’"

How AI agents are blurring the line between internal and external cyber threats

Enterprise security has historically maintained a meaningful distinction between external and internal threat vectors. External threats can be multidimensional, lightning fast, and come from a variety of vectors. On the other hand, internal threats were traditionally bounded by what a single human actor could accomplish before detection, constrained in speed, scope, and scale, but that distinction is falling apart as AI agents operate inside enterprise environments.

These agents have access to multiple systems simultaneously and move at speeds no human employee can match. When an agent makes a mistake, such as a hallucination, misread instruction, or an unintended data transfer, the resulting damage can look operationally identical to a malicious insider attack. And when an external attacker compromises an internal agent, they inherit its full access profile across every connected application.

"Whether or not the agent is an internal threat because of an inadvertent mistake or because it's been maliciously compromised, you need runtime guardrails that enforce your organizations policies consistently across agents," Rishi says. "The practical answer is an AI-native guardian layer that monitors agent behavior semantically, understands intent across actions, and can block or terminate a misbehaving agent at machine speed, then trigger recovery immediately."

Preparing for a world of inevitable compromise

Frontier AI models, including those capable of discovering and operationalizing zero-day vulnerabilities autonomously, are changing the economics of attacks.

As a result, interest in Mythos readiness is growing. Enterprises are increasingly operating under two assumptions: that attacks are inevitable, not exceptional, and that investment in resilience and rapid recovery must be treated as strategically as investment in prevention has been. The shift reframes recovery from a post-incident activity into a capability that is deliberately designed, tested, and continuously validated.

"The idea that you can recover quickly from an attack is going to become one of the most important facets of security," Rishi says. "It's the insurance policy that organizations now have to treat as a first-class citizen."

Why AI-powered cyber resilience depends on small models

True cyber resilience is a two-sided coin: it demands both real-time intelligent enforcement to intercept threats in motion, and automated recovery to restore operations immediately. While having backups is a baseline, organizations need workflows that can continuously monitor systems at machine speed, and instantly determine the most recent clean state under attack conditions.

Applying AI to the first half of that equation—real-time enforcement—creates a fundamental technical and economic challenge. Relying on massive frontier models to monitor every agent action introduces crippling latency overhead and exorbitant computing costs. A guardian AI system that slows down operations or costs as much as the systems it monitors is simply not viable for widespread adoption.

“It has to be a fast, small, and cheap AI model,” Rishi says. “No one wants to sign up for a secure solution that doubles their cost or latency.”

This is why small language models (SLMs) are critical for real-time enforcement. Rubrik’s approach, anchored by its acquisition of Predibase, is to build this frontline defense layer on small models optimized specifically for speed and efficiency. Unlike heavy frontier models, SLMs can semantically evaluate agent behavior at machine speed and at a fraction of the cost, acting as a real-time checkpoint.

That hyper-efficient enforcement layer is what enables a tighter, seamless connection to recovery. When the system observes an agent taking a destructive action—such as deleting a database, corrupting a critical file, or exfiltrating sensitive data—the small model detects it immediately, halts the damage, identifies the most recent clean snapshot from before the incident, and initiates recovery in a single, automated workflow.

The shift from incident response to architectural resilience

The broader implication of Mythos and similar frontier AI systems is a shift in how organizations think about security. As AI compresses the gap between attack and impact, resilience and recovery become architectural requirements rather than operational considerations.

Rubrik’s view is that security systems can no longer stop at detection. As AI agents gain greater autonomy, observability, identity context, and recovery must operate as a coordinated resilience layer. The goal is not simply to identify when something has gone wrong, but to shorten the gap between detection and restoration.

"The same thing that's introducing the threats, the frontier capabilities of models like Mythos, can also be used to help us combat the threat," Rishi says. "Positioning yourself for the AI era means closing the gap between detecting that something has gone wrong and restoring the systems that were affected, before the cost of that gap compounds."

Sponsored articles are content produced by a company that is either paying for the post or has a business relationship with VentureBeat, and they’re always clearly marked. For more information, contact sales@venturebeat.com.

Presented by Red Hat

At VentureBeat's recent AI Impact event, where the discussion centered on what separates enterprises that scale agentic AI from those that stall in pilot mode, Brian Gracely, senior director of portfolio strategy at Red Hat, detailed what companies actually run into once agents reach production.

He dove into cost discipline, the security blind spots unique to autonomous systems, and the organizational friction that determines whether agent adoption spreads beyond early champions.

Enterprises are overestimating how far behind they are on AI agents

Many enterprise leaders, especially those following industry keynotes and AI announcements, worry that they’re already falling dangerously behind competitors deploying agents at scale. But according to Gracely, much of that anxiety reflects a misconception about how quickly organizations learn once they begin building. Teams often move up the learning curve far faster than they expect.

That rapid progress creates a different challenge, however. As agent usage expands, AI costs rise just as quickly, turning cost management from an engineering concern into a recurring boardroom discussion.

Agentic AI usage is orders of magnitude higher than during the chatbot era, making AI costs a growing concern for enterprises. At the same time, organizations are becoming increasingly aware of their dependence on a small number of model providers. According to Gracely, that combination is driving many enterprises to explore alternatives that give them greater control over costs and infrastructure.

"The two or three top providers are already telling the market that they're losing money, and they're trying to go public to make up those gaps," he explained. "At some point, the dependency on that means you're either going to buy at a very high-cost level, or you're going to figure out alternatives to control what you're doing."

Right-sizing AI models is the fastest lever for cutting agent costs

The biggest cost issue is that enterprises overspend by defaulting to the most capable model available regardless of task complexity.

"If I'm simply trying to resolve an insurance claim, I don't need to know about the history of Western civilization in my model, I don't need to know World Cup soccer scores," Gracely said.

Semantic routing is the mechanism many companies use to make that judgment automatically, classifying requests and sending each to a model sized for the task without requiring users to choose, while infrastructure techniques like caching repetitive queries cut how often a request needs to reach GPU compute at all. Together, he said, these tools remove the assumption that efficiency and innovation pull in opposite directions.

"There's a lot you can do at a GPU infrastructure level, and quite a bit you can do in terms of flexibility of models," he explained. "Those give excellent choices in terms of the levers you're trying to pull, whether you need efficiency or you need innovation. That shouldn't be a binary choice."

The financial discipline needed for token spend is similar to the FinOps practices that took years to mature in order to take control of cloud compute spending. Those underlying frameworks will transfer even as the vocabulary changes, Gracely said, especially as organizations push for internal education on model selection so teams stop defaulting to the most prominent option for tasks that don't need it.

"The same way we first had to teach the financial people what an EC2 instance is and what an S3 bucket is, you're going to have to start explaining tokens to them," he said. "We don't always need a Rolls-Royce. We don't always need caviar, because we're trying to do basic types of things."

Patch speed is now critical as AI tools find vulnerabilities faster

AI-powered vulnerability discovery is forcing enterprises to rethink how quickly they can identify, validate and deploy patches. Long-established patch management cycles may no longer be fast enough in an environment where AI can uncover — and attackers can exploit — new vulnerabilities much more quickly.

"Most companies are probably going to have a window of somewhere between seven and 14 days to stay ahead," he said. "There are groups, Red Hat included, that are going to build patches for these, but the embargo window is going to be short."

AI is also changing what defenders need to look for. Rather than simply uncovering isolated critical flaws, AI security tools can identify combinations of seemingly minor vulnerabilities that become dangerous only when chained together. As both software complexity and vulnerability discovery accelerate, Gracely argued that the ability to rapidly manage and update software is becoming a strategic capability rather than simply an operational one.

Subject matter experts and compliance teams decide whether agents scale

In the end, organizational adoption comes down to the need for deep, sustained involvement from the subject matter experts whose knowledge the agent is meant to encode, which makes earning their buy-in a prerequisite rather than an afterthought.

"You have to think about the incentives, what you do for people who participate in this work so they don't feel threatened that it's going to take away their job, and how you incentivize people in the long run to cooperate with that innovation," he said.

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