Policy debates continue over how best to regulate artificial intelligence (AI) and harness its economic and other benefits while safeguarding society from its harms and risks.  For example, the European Union and China have opted to govern AI through different regulatory approaches, while the United States and some other countries have adopted different policy tools that they believe will better promote AI innovation. While countries and regions take different approaches, consensus is emerging across jurisdictions and among leading experts that there is an AI evaluation gap that must be promptly closed. 

Today’s AI evaluations fall short

The 2026 International AI Safety Report, prepared by more than one hundred experts and supported by more than 30 countries and multilateral organisations, explains that today’s AI evaluation techniques often fail to anticipate real-world performance.  This can occur when AI models produce overinflated test results or when AI testing environments materially differ from the real world.  Compounding the challenge, the “AI evidence dilemma” arises from the difficulties of assessing the risks of this rapidly evolving technology.

Boosting AI trust, diffusion, security and investment returns

Closing the AI evaluation gap will bring many benefits.  Sound AI evaluations would help increase understanding of AI’s performance and reliability and better inform decisions about its use.  This is critical since AI’s performance remains “jagged,” with some AI applications performing better than others.  

Helping people better understand AI’s reliability across contexts would enhance their trust in its appropriate use.  Similarly, reliable evaluations can also help buttress the security of AI systems.  All this, in turn, would help to support greater adoption and diffusion of secure and trusted AI applications and help organisations more fully reap the benefits of their AI investments.  

Reliable evaluation helps to reduce uncertainty for policymakers 

Better evaluation provides a greater evidence-based to inform AI policy choices. As explained in the 2026 International AI Safety Report, this could help reduce some of the uncertainty policymakers currently face.  Equipping policymakers with this information could lead to swifter, more confident policy decisions and help regulatory frameworks keep pace with AI’s rapid technological progress.  

Better evaluation could decrease operational costs and expand competition and access

Closing the AI evaluation gap could have the added benefit of reducing AI operating costs, potentially making trusted AI cheaper and more accessible.  Even with mature AI evaluations, there could be variation across jurisdictions on whether they are applied in a voluntary or mandatory manner.  However, if the evaluations underpinning different regulatory approaches are standardised, with little variation across regions, this could help companies and organisations reduce costs and increase ease of operating across borders.  In other words, reliable and standardised evaluation could help to foster both regulatory interoperability and innovation.  This, in turn, could lower barriers for new AI market entrants and support a healthy competition ecosystem.

Governments want better AI evaluations

Already, several governments are investing in closing the AI evaluation gap.  The White House AI Action Plan calls for building an evaluation ecosystem. In June 2026, US President Trump signed a new AI Executive Order establishing a voluntary framework for the government to test covered frontier models to improve secure innovation and cybersecurity.

These actions build on other important government-led AI evaluation efforts.  Following the establishment in 2023 of AI Safety Institutes by the UK and the US[SR1] [SR2]  (both renamed in 2025), a total of 11 jurisdictions, including the EU, India and Singapore, have now followed a similar model and established AI safety institutes or similar organisations that conduct testing and evaluation of foundation models.  Avenues have been paved for international co-ordination among these organisations.

Prior to the new US AI Executive Order, the US Center for AI Standards and Innovation (CAISI), mentioned above, announced voluntary agreements with xAI, Google, and Microsoft for pre-deployment frontier model testing.  These add to CAISI’s voluntary testing arrangements with Anthropic and OpenAI, as well as its collaborations with these companies to boost AI security and related measurement techniques.  The US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has evaluation programmes for generative AI.  Similarly, Korea and Singapore recently concluded joint tests of AI agents to evaluate data leakage.    The UK AI Security Institute also continues its cutting-edge frontier AI model evaluations.

The private sector is also expanding evaluation initiatives

After discovering that Mythos could detect severe vulnerabilities in all major web browsers and operating systems, Anthropic launched Project Glasswing to make the unreleased frontier model available to several organisations to help secure their systems.  Anthropic went a step further and committed to sharing its learnings with the broader community.  Additionally, several major AI developers launched the Frontier Model Forum (FMF), a collective effort to advance AI safety and security, and have released several publications, including a recent report, Managing Advanced Cyber Risks in Frontier AI Models.

A 5-step roadmap for closing the AI evaluation gap

To successfully close the AI evaluation gap, AI actors can take several steps, building on today’s existing efforts.  

 Step 1: Balance standardisation and customisation

First, to account for different languages, cultures, use cases, and norms, the evaluations should strive to balance standardisation and customisation.  At the 2026 AI Impact Summit in India, several companies pledged to improve multilingual and contextual evaluations to help achieve this balance.  

Step 2: Test throughout the AI lifecycle

Second, to address AI performance differences between controlled environments and the real world, evaluations should be conducted throughout the AI system lifecycle.  This approach is already embraced in several key publications and leading frameworks, including the International AI Safety Report and NIST’s AI Risk Management Framework.  The next step is to develop and implement evaluations for these different contexts.  

Step 3:  Build the right ecosystem 

Third, evaluations must be supported by a robust ecosystem, including qualified examiners.  This should be accompanied by methodologies for effectively communicating AI evaluation results to diverse audiences, including business users and affected individuals. At the same time, evaluations must preserve proprietary information about the AI systems.  Existing assurance practices used in the financial services and other sectors could further inform this work.  

Step 4:  Consider the AI value chain, technology and context.

Fourth, AI evaluations should be tailored to the needs of different actors in the AI value chain and different types of AI deployments.  For example, testing conducted upstream by large language model (LLM) developers may vary from the evaluations performed by companies deploying LLMs downstream.  In other words, the role an organisation plays in the AI ecosystem, including whether it enhances models downstream, should help determine the types of evaluations it implements.  

The rise of AI agents and Agentic AI capable of acting autonomously presents new evaluation challenges that governments and other stakeholders are working to address.  This reinforces the need to continuously assess the suitability of evaluation methodologies for different AI technologies and deployment settings.  

Step 5:  Create an efficient and trusted process

Finally, the process for developing AI evaluations also merits careful consideration.  To help ensure that evaluations address the appropriate factors, the process should capture global inputs from diverse stakeholders, including industry, government, academia and civil society.  To help keep pace with AI’s rapid development, the process should also leverage and co-ordinate the good work already being done. This includes the efforts of safety institutes and standards organisations, such as the “Zero Draft” project launched by NIST to expedite the standards process.  It should also consider the outputs of the OECD Hiroshima AI Process (HAIP) Reporting Framework.  A key purpose of the evaluation process is to  instill trust in everyone affected by a given AI system. 

The time is now

In sum, while much work remains to close the AI evaluation gap, as discussed above, there is already an emerging consensus, a solid foundation, and momentum to do so.  Closing the evaluation gap holds great promise of increasing AI trust, adoption, security, diffusion and investment returns.  Furthermore, it can help reduce policy uncertainty, increase regulatory interoperability, reduce costs for AI companies and organisations, and expand the availability of AI services and competition.  Simply put, the prize is worth the effort. 

The post A five-step roadmap to closing the AI evaluation gap appeared first on OECD.AI.

In our first post on the AI Wonk, Aliki Foinikopoulou, our Head of Global Public Policy, discussed the rapid evolution of the AI landscape. Less than a year later, the emergence of new technologies and a rapidly evolving regulatory landscape have added new layers of complexity. Against this backdrop, trust is more critical than ever. AI presents a generational opportunity, but harnessing it responsibly requires governments to play an active, deliberate role in shaping its development and deployment.

Salesforce was pleased to be one of the first companies to contribute to the reporting framework developed by the OECD under the Hiroshima AI Process (HAIP), and we were pleased to have contributed to the second version of the reporting framework, which offers an expanded view of the AI value chain. Over the last year, enterprise agentic AI has fundamentally shifted the business landscape, transforming organisations from simply using AI to becoming agentic enterprises. Now, more than ever, a common framework and language to articulate a path to trusted AI are critical.

The governance gap we can’t afford to ignore

The most consequential shift in artificial intelligence is not happening in a research lab. It is happening right now through decisions in boardrooms, legislatures, and the daily choices of millions of people. Governance frameworks need to keep up.

These decisions and choices are more critical today because AI has expanded beyond large, generative models that respond to prompts into the era of agentic AI, where systems autonomously plan, execute and adapt across complex, multi-step workflows. These agents can browse the web, write and run code, negotiate, make purchases and decisions. All with real-world consequences.

The AI value chain has expanded dramatically, spanning model developers, cloud infrastructure providers, orchestration platforms, data brokers, enterprise deployers and end users. Each new layer introduces fresh challenges: accountability gaps, opaque decision-making, and the potential erosion of meaningful human control.

The question is no longer whether AI should be governed. The question is how governance frameworks can keep pace.

Fragmentation is the real threat

The primary hurdle to responsible AI adoption today is not only technical but also regulatory fragmentation. As nations race to establish frameworks to govern AI, we are seeing a patchwork of rules that sometimes take different approaches. The divergent definitions of risk and transparency across jurisdictions not only create compliance headaches; they also contribute to governance gaps that small businesses cannot afford to bridge, leaving the advantage solely with the largest incumbents.

Consider a mid-sized logistics company deploying AI agents to manage cross-border freight and customs compliance. Unlike large incumbents, it has no dedicated AI governance team. In a fragmented regulatory environment, demonstrating responsible AI use means navigating a different set of voluntary and mandatory rules in every market where it operates, an effective barrier to entry that has nothing to do with the quality or safety of its technology. A harmonised framework with clear, tiered requirements based on risk level rather than company size would change that calculus entirely, enabling broader participation in the responsible AI economy.

A global bank using AI agents to automate processes is another good example. The EU requires human-interpretable reasoning trails; US regulators focus on disparate impact testing; the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) applies its own Fairness, Ethics, Accountability, and Transparency (FEAT) principles. Without a common standard, the bank either builds to the most restrictive version globally, which is expensive, or limits deployment to certain markets, leaving genuine value unrealised.

These aren’t hypothetical edge cases. They are the daily reality for Salesforce customers operating across jurisdictions.

We have seen this dynamic before. In the early days of the internet, cybersecurity was a fragmented landscape of jurisdiction-specific standards. It was not until we moved toward global interoperability through frameworks such as NIST and ISO that businesses could demonstrate their security programmes at scale. AI governance must follow the same blueprint to avoid fragmentation as the final reality.

Why HAIP matters

At Salesforce, my team in the Office of Ethical and Humane Use guides the responsible design, development, and deployment of our technologies. Ethical considerations must be embedded from the start in the product design of the AI platform and the agents themselves, and not just because of regulations, but because it is what our customers expect from Salesforce. But internal commitment alone is not enough. It must be paired with strong, globally coherent governance.

That’s why we are pleased to once again participate in the HAIP reporting framework and in the process to both streamline and broaden its base of participation. The ubiquity of AI means that frameworks like this need to be accessible and relevant to companies of all sizes across markets worldwide.

HAIP matters for several reasons, including:

• A common language: The HAIP Reporting Framework provides a standardised baseline that allows regulators and companies to compare compliance processes across the industry, an essential in a world where agentic AI means different things to different people. For a company like Salesforce, whose Agentforce platform is deployed by enterprises across the EU, US, Japan, and beyond, this matters enormously. Today, a multinational client must configure separate compliance documentation for each jurisdiction, even when the underlying agent and its safeguards are identical. A common language means that responsible design, built once, can be recognised everywhere.
  
  
• Global interoperability: In a fragmented regulatory environment, HAIP acts as a diplomatic bridge, ensuring that a company’s safety commitments in San Francisco carry weight in Tokyo and Brussels. Salesforce voluntarily publishes its responsible AI practices and invests heavily in making them robust, but without interoperability, those commitments must be re-translated for every regulatory context. That is not a problem of intent; it is a problem of infrastructure. HAIP provides that infrastructure.
  
  
• From “trust me” to “show me”: By making reports public on the OECD.AI platform, HAIP transforms transparency from a compliance burden to a competitive advantage and inspires a race to the top. Companies currently publish reports, such as Salesforce’s Trusted AI and Agents Report, on a voluntary basis. Centralising this kind of information from across industries on a single platform can further bolster the industry by publicly demonstrating a strong commitment to responsible AI. Critically, it also lowers the barrier for smaller companies: a streamlined, interoperable voluntary framework means that responsible AI is no longer a signal only large incumbents can afford to send.

A blueprint worth protecting

Just as the internet required global standards to scale safely, so too does AI. Just as the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard created a single payment security standard that allowed small businesses to accept credit cards globally without a compliance army, a coherent AI governance framework provides companies of all sizes with a clear, achievable bar rather than an ever-shifting patchwork of national rules. The Hiroshima AI Process is that tool, a shared blueprint for trust that governments and the private sector must now work together to strengthen and expand.

Realising the opportunity of agentic AI responsibly demands more than good intentions. It demands frameworks that are globally coherent, publicly accountable, and built to keep pace with the technology itself. Salesforce remains committed to that work because the future of AI should be governed by shared principles that are ethical, agile, humane, and built to last.

The post HAIP is transforming transparency from a compliance burden to a competitive advantage appeared first on OECD.AI.

This three-part blog series explores the growing complementarity between artificial intelligence (AI) and quantum technologies. The first post introduced quantum technologies and outlined their strengths and the challenges of combining AI with quantum systems. The second examined how AI can support the development of quantum technologies, helping to optimise systems and accelerate progress towards practical applications. In this third and final instalment, we turn to the reverse relationship: how quantum technologies – including computing, sensing and communication – could support the future evolution of AI systems.

Although large-scale, fault-tolerant quantum computers remain a long-term goal, early-stage quantum devices and their integration with existing AI systems are already paving the way for quantum-enhanced AI. These developments could eventually lead to meaningful improvements across many sectors of the economy and in daily life.

What technical breakthroughs could quantum computing bring to AI?

In recent years, AI systems have become more powerful and data-intensive, particularly through large language models (LLMs). These developments have made the limitations of classical computing, especially in speed, energy consumption and scalability, increasingly apparent. Quantum technologies could offer a pathway to expand the frontiers of classical computing, potentially overcoming today’s computing bottlenecks. However, quantum computers are not expected to replace existing AI systems. They are likely to coexist, with quantum systems excelling at solving specific types of problems that are difficult or intractable for conventional computers.

As quantum computing evolves, it is expected to strengthen AI in two main ways. First, quantum computers could significantly improve energy efficiency. Training AI requires substantial computing resources that consume vast amounts of electricity, raising economic, energy security, and environmental concerns. This is particularly true of LLMs.

These pressures apply more broadly across statistical AI techniques, such as machine learning, where increasing model complexity and data intensity are pushing the limits of classical computing. This is often characterised by experts as the slowing of or end to Moore’s Law.

Second, quantum computing could enhance the performance and capabilities of AI systems. This has fuelled growing interest in quantum machine learning (QML), which refers to machine learning methods implemented using quantum algorithms. QML is expected to improve AI system learning performance in areas such as optimisation, pattern recognition and high-dimensional data analysis.

In the long term, QML may reduce the computational requirements and energy footprint of some AI workloads by performing complex computations more efficiently, although this remains to be demonstrated at scale. QML remains in an early stage of development and faces three key bottlenecks:

• Data transfer constraints: Moving large volumes of classical data (bits) into and out of quantum systems (qubits) remains slow, limiting the suitability for data-intensive AI tasks.
• Unproven advantage: Demonstrating performance gains over highly optimised algorithms on classical computers remains challenging.
• Unclear hardware requirements: Defining hardware specifications for QML, including qubit counts and coherence times, remains difficult, making it challenging to develop practical QML roadmaps.

For these reasons, experts do not expect widespread commercial QML applications within the next decade.

Near-term pathways to AI applications

While QML is a longer-term prospect, quantum-inspired AI techniques are already delivering practical benefits. These approaches adapt concepts from quantum physics for use on classical computing hardware. One prominent example is the use of tensor networks, originally developed to simulate quantum systems, to compress LLMs.

These techniques have significant practical implications for AI developers. As neural networks such as LLMs become larger and more complex, deployment is constrained not only by fixed hardware limits such as memory and processing capacity but also by the computational and energy costs of training and running these systems.

Tensor-network compression to reduce memory use

Some research has shown that tensor-network compression can reduce memory use and computational demands by 10-100x, often with only modest reductions in accuracy after fine-tuning. These efficiency gains enable advanced AI models to run on conventional CPUs, edge devices and legacy infrastructure, expanding access beyond specialised high-performance computing environments.

Because these techniques do not require quantum hardware, they are already being embedded in commercial applications. Startups and technology providers are offering tensor-network-based compression tools and positioning them as a path to lower costs and energy consumption while improving deployment flexibility.

In practice, quantum-inspired compression is best understood as complementary to established methods such as pruning and quantisation for optimising neural network efficiency. Because they target different forms of redundancy in neural networks, tensor approaches can be combined with conventional techniques and, in some cases, outperform them in both efficiency and performance. Together, these developments illustrate how insights from quantum information science are already shaping the evolution of AI, even before large-scale quantum computers become widely available.

Hybrid quantum-classical computing

The most realistic near-term pathway for combining AI with actual quantum computers is through hybrid quantum-classical systems that leverage the strengths of both AI and quantum computing. In these systems, quantum processors perform specific sub-tasks, such as optimisation or simulation, while classical AI models handle data processing, interpretation and control. In this direction, several computing infrastructures are integrating quantum processors into high-performance computing environments, enabling researchers and industry actors to experiment with quantum-enhanced AI workflows. At the same time, cloud-based quantum platforms are lowering access barriers, allowing AI developers to test quantum algorithms, such as optimisation or sampling routines, that can be integrated into machine learning workflows.

These advances could eventually translate into practical applications across multiple sectors. In materials science and chemistry, quantum computing combined with AI may accelerate the discovery of new materials and drugs by enabling more accurate simulations of molecular behaviour. In manufacturing and logistics, hybrid quantum-AI approaches could improve the performance of complex optimisation tasks such as scheduling, resource allocation and supply chain planning. Financial services actors are also exploring quantum-enhanced modelling for portfolio optimisation and risk analysis, where large combinatorial search spaces pose challenges for classical AI methods.

How could quantum sensing expand AI’s possibilities, and where?

Beyond computing, quantum technologies may also enhance AI through advances in sensing. Quantum sensors can detect extremely small changes in magnetic fields, temperature, motion, or chemical composition, often with higher precision, stability, or spatial resolution than classical devices, thereby producing novel data streams. For AI systems, access to richer and more accurate data can translate directly into new applications across multiple sectors.

In healthcare, more sensitive sensing technologies could enable earlier disease detection and more accurate monitoring of health indicators. By capturing subtle biological or chemical changes that might otherwise go unnoticed, quantum sensors could provide richer data for AI systems to analyse, supporting faster diagnosis and more personalised treatment decisions.

In agriculture, improved sensing precision may help monitor soil conditions, crop health and environmental variables in greater detail, allowing AI tools to optimise irrigation, fertilisation and resource use for higher yields and greater efficiency. Similar approaches could support environmental monitoring, in which higher data quality can strengthen forecasting models and inform policy responses to climate and sustainability challenges.

Quantum sensing also has potential applications in infrastructure and industry. Sensors capable of detecting minute physical changes could help identify early signs of structural stress or equipment degradation in bridges, transport systems or energy facilities. When combined with AI-driven predictive maintenance, this information could enable earlier interventions, reduce operational disruptions and improve safety outcomes. More broadly, the integration of advanced quantum sensing with AI highlights an important dimension of technological progress: improvements in data quality and reliability can be just as transformative as advances in computing capabilities.

How could quantum communication support AI?

Quantum communication could enable secure networking conditions for federated learning and multi-agent systems, where multiple devices collaboratively train models without sharing raw data. Quantum-secure communication channels could make it easier for different parties to share sensitive information (e.g., in healthcare, finance, or critical infrastructure) while reducing the risk of interception or data leakage, especially when training or inference occurs in distributed cloud environments. Research and patent applications are exploring whether entanglement-enabled networks or quantum-secured links could support distributed training architectures across geographically separated computing resources. Although these concepts remain largely experimental, early prototypes are already exploring secure distributed machine learning architectures built on quantum communication protocols.

Quantum communication may also become important for integrating AI with quantum sensing systems. Some advanced quantum sensors generate information directly in quantum states, which cannot always be measured or transmitted using conventional classical channels without losing valuable information. Quantum networking could allow these states to be transferred between devices or processing nodes while preserving their quantum properties, enabling more sophisticated analysis pipelines that combine sensing, computation and AI-driven interpretation.

Leveraging quantum and AI complementarities for a shared technological future

This three-part series examined the potential and challenges of combining AI and quantum technologies, from foundational concepts to emerging applications and future pathways. As we have seen, AI is also accelerating progress in quantum technologies themselves, for example, by improving calibration, noise reduction and experimental design. This bidirectional relationship (AI for quantum and quantum for AI) is likely to shape the next phase of innovation in both fields.

As outlined in this series, the integration of AI and quantum technologies could reshape scientific discovery, healthcare, industry and sustainability. At the same time, significant challenges remain, including technical limitations, talent shortages at the interface between the two technologies, ethical considerations and the need for international collaboration.

As we stand at the early stages of this transformation, one conclusion is clear: the digital future will not be built by AI or quantum technologies alone, but rather through their interplay and collaboration.

Learn more about the OECD work on quantum technologies: www.oecd.org/en/topics/sub-issues/quantum-technologies.html

The post How quantum technologies could open new frontiers for AI appeared first on OECD.AI.

Tracking the uptake of artificial intelligence (AI) poses a fundamental measurement challenge. Recent data, such as Eurostat’s survey, are useful but often limited in geographic and chronological coverage and can be difficult to adjust as technologies change. Given that AI usage is evolving rapidly, frequently updated data sources can help us understand the dynamics and address data gaps.

To measure AI usage in real time, the OECD.AI team has developed an approach that leverages web traffic data. Platforms such as Similarweb provide estimates of website and app visitors, offering a window into how users interact with digital services at scale.  This web traffic data enables researchers to track usage trends for AI chatbot interfaces and services.

While these data should be interpreted with appropriate methodological caveats, they offer unique insights into real-time dynamics of how the public is using AI.

A new measure of AI chatbot usage

To build a measure of monthly usage of GenAI chatbots, we focus on direct user engagement through AI web interfaces. It uses the number of unique, deduplicated visitors over a two-year period between 1 February 2024 and 30 March 2026 to the three main AI chatbot websites, ChatGPT, Claude and Gemini. According to the data, these three sites account for essentially all web traffic to chatbot interfaces in GPAI countries, as users of other sites will almost always also use one of the three leading sites and would therefore be removed during the deduplication process anyway.  

With the number of unique visitors across the three chatbots, divided by population from IMF projections, the new measure of GenAI chatbot usage is computed.

There are a few methodological limitations to this approach as a proxy for broader AI adoption. This metric focuses on consumers, capturing only AI chatbot usage, and therefore excludes embedded or API-based uses of AI, which are increasingly central to enterprise applications and productivity-enhancing workflows. Additionally, web traffic data may be difficult to estimate for smaller jurisdictions and may introduce some bias into the country-level data. The estimates rely entirely on SimilarWeb data collection, which is subject to its own panel and estimation biases.

GenAI chatbot usage has grown rapidly

Across GPAI countries, this new measure of GenAI chatbot usage has surged over the past year, from roughly 18% of the population, on average, in January 2025 to 28% in January 2026. The countries seeing the highest growth in this measure in 2025 were Japan and Türkiye, where usage rates more than doubled. Singapore is consistently the top user per capita, and also experienced the largest increase in absolute terms, rising from 36% to 63% of the population using AI chatbots in 2025. You can explore the data for yourself in (Figure 1).

Figure 1. GenAI chatbot usage rates between February 2024 and March 2026

https://chart.oecd.ai/29736

Notes: Costa Rica, Estonia, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Senegal, Slovenia missing due to insufficient data. GenAI usage rates use deduplicated unique visitors from ChatGPT, Claude, and Gemini. Sources: OECD.AI calculations using data from SimilarWeb and the IMF.

The intensity of use among GenAI chatbot users has also grown. Figure 2 shows that in mid-2024, the average visit length to AI chatbots across GPAI countries was about 4.5 minutes. This grew to over 5.5 minutes in early 2026, signalling more intensive consumer use.

Figure 2. Average visit duration to AI chatbots in seconds

GenAI chatbot use demographics

Younger audiences use AI chatbots the most. A deeper look at the data provides a better understanding of the demographics of AI users. First, GenAI chatbot usage remains much higher among younger consumers. According to the data, over half of people aged 25-34 in February 2026 used GenAI chatbots across GPAI countries, while only about 8% of people aged 65 and over were chatbot users (Figure 3).

Figure 3. GenAI adoption rate by age group

Usage among older consumers accounts for much of the recent growth. While individuals under 35 still account for more than half of all GenAI chatbot users in 2026, their share has gradually declined. Between February 2024 and February 2026, the share of visitors aged 35 and over increased from 38% to 48%. This suggests that much of the recent growth in AI chatbot adoption has been driven by older age groups, indicating that usage is becoming more mainstream and widespread across the broader population (Figure 4).

Figure 4. Age distribution of AI users

Recreational AI use and younger populations. Looking beyond the three most popular AI chatbots, the data show that usage varies widely across age groups. Figure 5 shows that people under the age of 25 are much more likely to use Character.AI (a free chatbot that lets you create digital characters and interact with them via text, voice messages and calls) than any other chatbot. This indicates more recreational use among that age group. Older age groups, by contrast, are much more likely to use Microsoft Copilot, perhaps due to built-in referrals and employer-funded subscriptions.

Figure 5. Share of AI Chatbot usage by age groups

Different chatbots, different jobs

Browsing patterns also indicate differences in how AI chatbots are used. Users of ChatGPT and Gemini are more likely to also visit recreational-oriented platforms such as YouTube, Instagram, and Facebook. In contrast, users of Claude and Microsoft Copilot more frequently visit sites such as LinkedIn, cloud platforms, Notion, and GitHub. This suggests that Claude and Copilot users are concentrated in professional settings, particularly for workplace productivity and coding-related tasks (Table 1). The use of Copilot, in particular, seems to be largely driven by Microsoft’s own ecosystem.

Table 1. Most relevant domains for users of top chatbots for 2025

Relevance score ranks	chatgpt.com	gemini.google.com	copilot.microsoft.com	claude.ai
1	google.com	reddit.com	bing.com	github.com
2	youtube.com	instagram.com	login.live.com	stackoverflow.com
3	instagram.com	youtube.com	msn.com	notion.so
4	reddit.com	github.com	m365.cloud.microsoft	aistudio.google.com
5	facebook.com	facebook.com	github.com	linkedin.com

Men are more likely to use GenAI chatbots, but numbers differ by country. For the most part, men use GenAI chatbots at a higher rate than women across GPAI countries, although the gap is relatively small (Figure 6). Over time, the gap has fluctuated: decreasing in 2025 before expanding again in 2026. These variations are largely due to country-specific changes: throughout 2024, there was a rapid increase in female adoption in Finland, the Czech Republic, New Zealand, Denmark and Hungary, while in 2025, there was a relatively faster increase in male adoption in Korea, the United States, Norway, Germany and Türkiye.

Figure 6. GenAI usage rate by gender

However, some countries display more pronounced differences: Korea shows the largest gender gap, with male usage rates nearly double those of women. Germany and Italy also show significantly higher usage among men. By contrast, Singapore, the GPAI country with the highest overall usage rate, and Colombia, the Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, and Saudi Arabia are the countries where female users adopt AI chatbots at a higher rate than male users (Figure 7).

Figure 7. Male and female AI usage rates by country

How trustworthy are these estimates?

GenAI usage rates by country in this analysis are broadly in line with other measures of GenAI tool usage, such as the Eurostat survey and the Microsoft AI Economy Institute (Figure 8). In 2025, Eurostat estimated that just under 33% of people aged 16-74 in the EU had used generative AI tools in the past 3 months. Microsoft’s AI Economy Institute found an average usage rate of 30% over GPAI countries for which data are available. In our estimates, we find that 27% of the total population has used AI on average over the last quarter of 2025. Overall, our measure is strongly aligned with these benchmarks, with a statistically significant correlation of 0.63 with Eurostat estimates and an even stronger correlation of 0.78 with Microsoft’s estimates.

Figure 8. SimilarWeb GenAI usage rates correlate strongly with other estimates and offer broad coverage

As AI use becomes mainstream, usage data across countries and demographic groups provide broad insights

Taken together, these results give us a clearer view of GenAI usage and how the picture is evolving. Usage is no longer niche. In just a year, GenAI chatbot use jumped from under a fifth to almost a third of the population across GPAI countries, with countries like Singapore and the Netherlands already seeing usage rates close to or above 50%. At the same time, differences in aggregate use between countries remain significant and warrant closer attention.

AI is also moving beyond its early adopters. While younger users still lead, much of the recent growth is coming from people over 35, signalling that chatbots are becoming mainstream. At the same time, usage is not uniform: some users engage with AI for recreational purposes, while others integrate it into productivity, coding, and workplace tasks. Gender gaps exist as well, but vary widely across countries, highlighting the importance of local context.

Traditional surveys remain essential but provide snapshots and are difficult to adjust to the pace of AI change. Web traffic data helps fill that gap by showing real-time GenAI usage data, how it shifts over time, and how patterns differ across countries and groups. Combined with other indicators on OECD.AI, these data provide a more complete and timely picture of AI diffusion and uptake.

---

Methodological considerations

SimilarWeb’s data comes from several sources:

• An anonymised panel of millions of Internet users with URL tracking enabled and some demographic information
• Partnerships with websites and data aggregators to directly share data on website analytics
• Online resources and public information

Our analysis relies largely on SimilarWeb’s “unique visitors” metric, defined as the total number of distinct users visiting a domain in each month. This approach involves a deduplication process that accounts for the shared visitors from each of the three most popular chatbots. ChatGPT unique visitors were spliced to account for the domain transition from openai.com. The estimates cover the vast majority of users, as users of other chatbots typically also visit one of the three captured here, and would therefore almost always be removed during the deduplication process.

These data cover the period from February 2024 to March 2026, a timeframe that captures significant developments in the AI landscape. The analysis is also further scoped down to the 37 Global Partnership on AI (GPAI) countries available on the SimilarWeb platform (see https://oecd.ai/en/about/about-gpai for more information on GPAI). As of this analysis, these countries are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czechia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Türkiye, United Kingdom, and the United States.

The lower adoption rates in the SimilarWeb estimates when compared to other estimates mainly reflect differences in how each source defines an AI user. First, in the Eurostat data, the distinction is not made on how the user is accessing AI and is therefore considered a broader indicator than our SimilarWeb approach, which focuses solely on AI chatbots accessed via the website (i.e. not including App users). For example, respondents to the Eurostat survey may consider the AI summaries given after Google queries to be a use of generative AI, but is not captured in our measure. Secondly, someone counts as an AI user if they used AI at least once in the past three months in the Eurostat survey, while Microsoft uses a six-month window. Our measure takes the monthly average, which means that a person who visits a chatbot only once during the three-month period (to align with Eurostat) contributes less than someone who uses AI regularly.

Ultimately, each source comes with its own strengths and limitations:

• Survey-based measures such as Eurostat have good statistical adjustments to account for demographics but can be affected by response biases and sampling uncertainty.
• Microsoft has access to real-time, proprietary AI use data, but their estimates rely on assumptions about market share and internet penetration to scale their data.
• SimilarWeb has broad geographical coverage and is based on real click-based data, but it also captures only chatbot usage and relies partly on panel-based web traffic data and its own modelling assumptions, which may be biased.

Taken together, the differences highlight why no single measure currently captures AI adoption on its own.  Our new GenAI usage estimates provide a valuable perspective: a timely, internationally comparable indicator that helps track users, their demographics, and how regularly they engage with AI chatbots in practice.

The post How people are using GenAI chatbots: Evidence from web traffic data appeared first on OECD.AI.

Global agri-food systems are under growing strain. Even though the world produces enough calories to feed more than the world’s entire population, one in eleven people – or nearly 700 million people – still face hunger. Climate shocks, fragile supply chains, and labour shortages increasingly threaten the resilience of agri-food systems worldwide. As pressure on farmers and supply chains intensifies, artificial intelligence (AI) is a promising tool to ensure that all stakeholders – including vulnerable populations – can benefit from the transition towards more resilient agri-food systems. 

Agri-food systems face growing strain – AI tools offer solutions 

The agricultural sector plays an essential role in economies and societies around the world, providing communities with reliable, quality food and tens of millions of jobs. Yet the global agri-food system is under pressure, as various issues, from climate challenges to workforce shortages, put strain on farmers and global supply chains.  

AI offers opportunities to address the needs of farmers and other actors in the agri-food system across diverse local contexts. And AI is already transforming agriculture and related supply chains. It helps farmers predict droughts, reduce pesticide use and identify crop diseases before they spread. It supports buyers, traders and retailers in making decisions regarding product availability, quality and prices. AI-enabled precision spraying can reduce pesticide use by up to 30% without compromising yields. Drought-tolerant traits identified using AI in sorghum and chickpea crops boost yields by up to 25% during dry seasons. And the Global AI Hybrid Rice Platform shortens breeding cycles by predicting optimal parent combinations.  

However, challenges persist in the adoption of AI and other digital technologies. Access to these promising tools is starkly uneven, and so is the distribution of information throughout supply chains. In Australia, nearly 96% of farmers use digital tools, whereas in Chile, just 12% do. In addition, issues persist in data interoperability between different stakeholders and jurisdictions, which hinder data sharing opportunities and limit the impact of digital tools. Digital tools need to be accessible, trusted and designed to respond to local user conditions.  

Cybersecurity must also be treated as a foundational prerequisite for AI-enabled agri-food systems (e.g. through secure-by-design approaches). Without robust protections from cyber threats and concrete actions such as building digital literacy and aligning policy agendas, there is a risk that the potential of using digital technologies will not be realised or will have adverse consequences. At the same time, the lack of agri-food-specific AI governance could create regulatory uncertainty, making the case for targeted frameworks that promote the trustworthy deployment of AI while accounting for the sector’s unique characteristics. 

These issues were at the centre of a flagship session on AI for Inclusive and Resilient Food Systems, co-hosted by the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the OECD at the India AI Impact Summit in New Delhi in February 2026. The session leveraged the work of the Summit’s Working Group on Economic Growth and Social Good, co-chaired by India, Indonesia and the Netherlands. Examples from these three countries and field‑level research highlighted where AI is already showing great promise and where critical bottlenecks remain.  

These insights point to three areas where deeper international co-operation and policy analysis facilitated by organisations such as the OECD could help countries make meaningful progress. Specifically, the OECD’s Global Partnership on AI (GPAI), could take next steps and examine where AI is delivering results in agri-food systems across various regions and what it will take to ensure benefits are widely shared. 

The opportunity: How AI can help build efficient and resilient supply chains for global food security  

Efficient and resilient supply chains are cornerstones of the agriculture sector and global food security. Strengthening global food security is a strategic priority for countries like the Netherlands because reliable, sustainable and affordable food systems are essential for societal stability and economic development, particularly in vulnerable regions. After the United States, the Netherlands is the world’s second-largest exporter of agricultural products. The Dutch have already seen tangible results from AI applications in agriculture. According to research from Wageningen University, AI tools for advanced greenhouses have yielded water savings of up to 90% through smart irrigation, compared to traditional open-field systems. 

The challenge is that successful solutions in countries like the Netherlands cannot always be exported to other countries due to the diversity of agricultural contexts worldwide. In view of this complexity, partnerships are an important tool. Examples from the Netherlands highlight the importance of co-creation as a vital strategy for tangible results. The Netherlands works with other countries to develop locally relevant AI solutions that are inclusive and accessible to farmers through knowledge sharing, capacity-building and co-creation. 

The use of AI can also help reshape how companies engage with stakeholders across supply chains and help to manage risks. Tools intended to improve efficiency (e.g. automated advisory systems, remote monitoring, or worker feedback platforms) can enhance visibility and responsiveness, but they can also displace meaningful human engagement if not carefully implemented. Managing these trade-offs is therefore essential to ensure that AI contributes positively to sustainability efforts. The OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Business Conduct and AI-specific due diligence guidance provide a practical framework for managing these risks. It promotes a risk-based, continuous approach grounded in stakeholder engagement, with step-by-step operational guidance to identify, prevent, mitigate, and account for adverse impacts. 

Despite promising tools and guidance, in practice, there are persistent problems with AI adoption across agri-food systems and supply chains, including among farmers. Below are three key challenges which would benefit further from OECD and GPAI analysis and co-operation. 

Solving the data problem: improving interoperability and shared agricultural data  

Across regions, the most consistent barrier to effectively using AI in agriculture is data: not enough of it, not widely shared, not of high enough quality and often not interoperable. Addressing these challenges is at the core of many initiatives of the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture (LVVN), as well as EU initiatives such as the Common Agriculture European Data Space and the European Digital Infrastructure Consortium for Agri-Food.  

When agricultural data remains siloed between ministries, supply‑chain actors or countries, AI tools underperform in real‑world conditions. This challenge surfaces in examples such as global crop mapping efforts, which struggle when key national data is unavailable, and contrasts sharply with locally tailored tools. Data interoperability is critical not only for enhancing transparency and traceability but also for enabling benchmarking that drives competitiveness and for unlocking new market opportunities. 

In the cocoa industry, for example, which is suffering heavily from climate change, researchers from Wageningen University built a chatbot in the farmers’ local languages to identify plant diseases using computer vision trained on local data in the form of images. It worked because it was built with locally sourced data using the farmers’ perspective, not the researchers’. This shows that not only are data availability, quality, and interoperability important, but trust also plays a critical role in AI uptake. The same is true for AI literacy. For example, an AI tool’s success in the field depends greatly on a farmer’s ability to generate, manage and apply high‑quality, context‑specific data. This could include skills spanning data literacy (e.g., collection, quality control, labelling), applied digital skills (e.g., the use of sensors), and general skills for successfully interpreting and assessing AI outputs.   

Building shared and trustworthy data infrastructures is a challenge well suited to multilateral co-operation. The OECD and GPAI could help countries examine which types of agricultural data are most critical for AI uptake, how to enable cross-border interoperability, and how governance, incentives, and standards can encourage responsible data sharing without disadvantaging farmers or exposing sensitive information. Such analysis would complement ongoing OECD and GPAI work on AI governance and help countries design data ecosystems – for example, through bilateral agreements – that support resilience rather than reinforce fragmentation. 

Small but mighty: ensuring AI works for small farmers through local relevance and co-design  

AI will only advance global food security if it also works for small farmers – who grow roughly one‑third of the world’s food but are also most vulnerable to climate and market shocks. Many tools fail to provide the expected socio-economic value because they are built for ideal conditions or assume a baseline of digital maturity that simply does not exist. The most effective way to address these issues is to begin with the farmer’s perspective. 

Examples from India illustrate this opportunity. A voice-first AI tool developed by the Government of India, called BharatVistaar, provides farmers with a breadth of agricultural advisory information on subjects ranging from shrimp cultivation to pest control. It comes as a simple phone call or text message from a chatbot, in their local language, with no smartphone required. This accessible, low-tech solution shows how AI can benefit farmers who lack access to complex technology or reliable internet. 

This is an area where the OECD and GPAI’s evidence base and global reach could offer unique value. Through comparative analysis and its global network of experts, the OECD could help countries better understand what farmer-centred AI design looks like in practice; which models scale across different agricultural contexts; and how to build trust by aligning tools with real-world decision‑making. Sharing case studies through the OECD.AI Policy Observatory, sharing concrete field-level agri-food system AI tools through the OECD.AI Catalogue of Tools and Metrics, contributing policies to the OECD.AI Policy Navigator, leveraging the OECD.AI Policy Toolkit, and sharing local lessons at GPAI meetings could help countries learn from each other’s successes and pitfalls. 

Moving from pilots to scale 

Scaling AI solutions in agri-food settings is not easy. Solutions that perform well technically often falter in field conditions, and many projects remain stuck as promising pilots that never achieve systemic impact. Factors such as infrastructure gaps, cybersecurity threats, institutional capacity, financing constraints and lack of local adaptation all limit the path from prototype to widespread adoption. 

Scaling and resilience in agri-food systems must extend beyond agriculture itself to the AI infrastructures that underpin it, as cyberattacks can render systems unavailable – particularly impacting smallholder farmers. An emphasis on accessibility without security could lead to unsustainable outcomes, making cybersecurity a critical precondition for success. 

Countries like the Netherlands are working with partners to co-create AI solutions that are secure and deeply adapted to local ecosystems to be successful in scaling up. Indonesia also offers a compelling example. With more than 17 000 islands with varied soil conditions and uneven infrastructure, the country sees AI as essential to developing resilient agriculture and has integrated AI into its national strategy for climate-resilient agriculture to combat scaling challenges related to its diverse geography.  

A structured examination of what it takes to scale AI responsibly for agriculture – across geographies, farm sizes and value chains – could provide actionable insights for governments worldwide. This could include analysing enabling policies, public‑private partnerships, field-level capacity building, and pathways for adapting successful models to regions with differing levels of infrastructure development. 

With its cross-country reach and evidence-based approach, the OECD, through GPAI, is well-positioned to convene comparative analysis of scaling and cybersecurity challenges, identifying practical levers to help countries move from fragmented experimentation to system-wide adoption. 

Looking ahead: tackling these challenges through the Global Partnership on AI  

AI has the potential to transform global agri-food systems, but technology alone cannot deliver this outcome. The choices made around governance, access and partnerships will determine whether AI strengthens resilience broadly or deepens existing divides. Advancing AI for sustainable agri-food systems depends on addressing the three imperatives discussed above – ensuring access to high-quality data by building interoperable, trusted data ecosystems; designing farmer-led, locally relevant solutions; and creating the conditions to scale securely and sustainably through robust infrastructure, governance, and strong cybersecurity to safeguard system resilience. These topics are at the core of the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture’s (LVVN) priorities and must be complemented by fit-for-purpose policy frameworks alongside viable financial models, knowledge exchanges, and innovation partnerships to enable effective and inclusive adoption. 

The OECD works with countries – including the Netherlands – at various levels of economic development to establish AI governance based on the OECD AI Principles. The OECD.AI Policy Navigator gives access to AI policy initiatives in the agriculture sector, covering more than 2,000 AI policies and initiatives across 80 jurisdictions. Any country can use it to benchmark and strengthen its approach. Further analysis of the challenges and opportunities for AI in agri-food systems could be undertaken as part of initiatives such as GPAI and groups like the OECD-FAO Advisory Group on Responsible Agricultural Supply Chains.  

Interested countries and partners are invited to contact ai@oecd.org to explore this topic further.  

The post AI for inclusive and resilient agri-food systems: Potential ways forward   appeared first on OECD.AI.

Artificial intelligence (AI) is both a technology story and a policy challenge. Governments across sectors and regions are grappling with the same question: how to effectively support the safe, trustworthy development and use of AI in ways that align with their countries’ needs?

Whether setting a national AI strategy or designing concrete initiatives to implement it, governments need guidance that meets them where they are. From experience, I can attest that the hardest part is rarely agreeing on principles; it is finding concrete, comparable examples of how others made them work. That is the gap the OECD AI Policy Toolkit closes.

Released yesterday by the OECD under the Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence (GPAI), the AI Policy Toolkit is the first version of a practical, non-prescriptive guide for policymakers to translate the OECD AI Principles into action—a deliberate shift from defining what good AI policy requires to showing how to build it.

What the Toolkit does

The Toolkit is an interactive, evolving platform to support policymakers throughout the AI policy cycle. It complements OECD.AI’s broader ecosystem of tools for data, analysis and AI governance.

The Toolkit helps governments target and prioritise where to act. Through AI-powered semantic search, it surfaces relevant policy examples and guidance drawn from real-world practice, turning the OECD’s accumulated evidence into options a policymaker can use the same day—rather than a library to be read.

Built with policy-makers, not just for them

A year ago, the 2025 OECD Ministerial Council Meeting set this work in motion. What followed was less a drafting exercise than a year of listening—and the Toolkit released today reflects what countries told us they needed.

Far from being a top-down exercise, the OECD Secretariat developed the Toolkit with end-users through co-creation across regions. Targeted interviews and four co-creation workshops across Southeast Asia, Latin America and Africa—one of which Costa Rica was proud to host—brought policymakers, industry and experts together to shape its design around how governments actually work and make decisions.

Not only did these co-creation workshops highlight both shared challenges and region-specific priorities. They grounded the Toolkit in fundamental policy questions:

• How to navigate trade-offs between local and global AI models, or between innovation and regulation?
• How to address infrastructure gaps, such as AI compute capacity?
• How to scale AI in agriculture, education or healthcare?

Two lessons that shaped the Toolkit

Moreover, the collaborative approach to developing the Toolkit has yielded important collective lessons.

• First, context is decisive: AI policy must reflect national needs and preferences, institutional capacity and levels of digital maturity.
• Second, addressing shared global challenges such as managing risks posed by advanced AI systems or ensuring diverse linguistic and cultural representation in AI models requires international cooperation as well as tailored policy responses.

Our sincere thanks go to the governments and organisations that, alongside Costa Rica, made this possible—notably Italy, France, Korea, Japan, the United Kingdom, the European Union, the French Development Agency and the Inter-American Development Bank—and to the policymakers and experts who contributed their time and insight. I also commend the OECD Secretariat for its sustained work.

What comes next

The OECD Ministerial Council Meeting (MCM) marks the Toolkit’s first release, which is an important milestone, but it is far from the finish line.

As AI technologies and related policy issues develop, the OECD remains dedicated to ensuring the Toolkit stays relevant through regular updates by:

• Refining and improving the Toolkit through ongoing feedback and iteration
• Incorporating more policy examples and use cases to strengthen its practical relevance via the OECD.AI Policy Navigator
• Expanding its coverage of emerging policy issues, including sector-specific guidance, infrastructure and regulatory approaches

From shared principles to shared practice

The OECD AI Policy Toolkit results from a collaborative effort to transform AI principles into implementation. By integrating OECD standards with regional insights, it guides policymakers in leveraging AI’s opportunities while responsibly and effectively managing its challenges.

The Toolkit’s success will be measured not by its launch but by the policies it helps shape. Its impact depends on sustained collaboration and support. A year from now, I expect us to point to concrete cases where this tool moved a country from principle to practice—better AI policies for better lives.

The post The OECD AI Policy Toolkit: Better AI policies for better lives appeared first on OECD.AI.

Emerging AI capabilities in coding, tool utilisation, and multi-step reasoning, which is core to agentic AI, are shaping a more complex digital security environment. AI-based applications and services are becoming increasingly integrated into software, public services, vital sectors, and the broader economy, offering new opportunities for productivity and innovation. However, they also introduce new types of security exposure – misconfigurations and weaknesses that can lead to unauthorised access.

What AI security means in practice

AI security builds on traditional cybersecurity and goes beyond it. Today’s AI applications are trained on vast, diverse data and increasingly embedded in workflows that retrieve information, use tools, store memory, and perform multi-step tasks. Distinct AI security risks arise because models learn from data, behave probabilistically, and, in agentic systems, act more autonomously.

Many of the most important  AI security risk patterns are only beginning to emerge. The evidence base remains uneven across issues such as prompt injection, agentic misuse, model poisoning, and the security of connected tools. AI technologies are by nature cross-border and cross-sectoral, meaning that no single country, company, or institution can adequately address the security challenges they create alone. This is especially true as AI agents become more capable and more embedded in real-world contexts.

Because AI models and applications operate across borders, security measures require international cooperation on shared methods, common tools and information-sharing channels. The same foundational research can also support adjacent safeguards, from content provenance against deepfakes to safer AI chatbot design.

To meet new security requirements, AI developers and governments across jurisdictions and sectors will need to drive additional joint research, more comparable evaluation methods and robust best practices. These should cover the full AI security lifecycle, from protecting models and pre-deployment assets such as model weights and datasets to the security and resilience of AI applications and services during deployment, especially in critical sectors.

A first approach to strengthening AI security requirements would be to pool resources across three areas: resilience against scalable, reusable attacks, such as prompt injection, particularly at the interaction layer; ensuring the secure connection of AI agents to tools and services; and strengthening safeguards for models, model weights, and training data integrity.

Priority 1: Defending against transferable and automated prompt-injection attacks

Direct and indirect prompt-injection attacks are becoming more reusable, scalable, and security relevant. That is why security researchers at the Open Worldwide Application Security Project (OWASP) rank prompt injections among the most prevalent AI security risks. While evidence on transferability is still developing, recent research suggests that some attacks can be adapted across harmful tasks and, in some cases, across different models.

For example, an AI assistant used in a workplace might be asked to summarise a document or webpage. If that content contains hidden malicious instructions, the system could be manipulated into ignoring the user’s request, revealing sensitive information, or taking an unintended action. That raises practical questions for enterprise deployment, testing, and incident response.

This matters because reusable or automated prompt-injection methods reduce attacker costs and make attacks easier to repeat. For policymakers, this shifts the question from whether a model can be bypassed in a lab setting to whether it remains resilient to attacks that are reused, adapted and improved over time.

The frontier security community should prioritise understanding why some prompt-injection attacks transfer more readily than others and develop evaluations that reflect adaptive, automated attack strategies. Rather than simply blocking known prompt patterns, they should also identify techniques that improve robustness. Recent benchmark work from MLCommons, a technical safety organisation, suggests that classifying attacks by model-manipulation techniques would help evaluators get closer to the underlying mechanisms of vulnerability.

Automated prompt-injection techniques are becoming more transferable and scalable, making it easier to discover, reproduce and act on vulnerabilities across systems. Evaluation capacity will therefore need to support ongoing assessment of how advances in frontier AI may accelerate vulnerability discovery and exploitation. This will be critical both for ensuring defensive testing keeps pace with evolving attack methods and for helping countries use AI more effectively to strengthen cyber resilience.

International collaboration could improve prompt injection evaluations and universal jailbreaks by making it easier to identify reusable and transferable vulnerabilities. International collaboration could improve evaluations of prompt injection and universal jailbreaks by identifying reusable and transferable vulnerabilities. It could also help to direct research investments from governments and frontier labs toward more robust evaluations and more durable defences.

Priority 2: Securing AI agents

AI agents create a new set of security challenges. Attacks can manipulate content before an agent application retrieves it, misuse connected tools, or hide malicious instructions in documents processed by the agentic system.

Consider an AI agent connected to email, calendars or payment tools. With broad permissions and malicious instructions, failures can become concrete: the agent may share sensitive information, trigger unwanted actions, or move the user’s money in unintended ways.

 Because agents can plan tasks, use tools, retain memory and interact with other systems, each capability creates new opportunities for misuse and failure. Three examples illustrate this challenge:

1. Memory poisoning: Attackers insert malicious content into an agent’s memory or long-lived context, causing harmful behaviour that goes undetected and persists in future interactions.
2. Tool misuse: As AI systems adopt standardised methods, such as the Model Context Protocol (MCP), to connect to external tools, databases, and services, weak identity controls or excessive permissions can create new security gaps.
3. Context-based instruction attacks: Malicious instructions are hidden in emails, documents, or web pages and then retrieved by an agentic AI system, which treats them as part of its working context, potentially leading to unintended actions or data leakage.

These patterns go beyond traditional threat models. Recent work, including OWASP’s Top 10 for Agentic Applications, reflects a broader recognition that memory, connected tools, identity, permissions and multi-step autonomy create a distinct security profile for agentic systems.

Developments in the financial sector illustrate how quickly these questions are becoming pressing. On 2 March 2026, Banco Santander and Mastercard announced what they described as Europe’s first live, end-to-end payment executed by an AI agent within a regulated banking framework. As agentic AI systems move into higher-stakes domains, coordination on security baselines and implementation practices will become increasingly important.

AI agents will need to be made secure by design, and the external tools and services they connect to will need to be made secure. Design improvements could include stronger memory safeguards, better permission design and more effective sandboxing. Measures to make services reliant on agentic AI more robust could include research into deterministic controls that constrain how an agent can transfer information among untrusted content, memory and tool actions.

Cybersecurity institutions need to be involved from the beginning because issues related to AI agents—such as permissions, connected tools, and secure deployment in sensitive settings—build on well-understood challenges faced by cyber agencies. International collaboration among AI Institutes could help adapt existing security practices to agentic systems, identify shared vulnerabilities, and promote more uniform methods for testing, incident management, and secure deployment.

Priority 3: Detecting and mitigating model poisoning

Model poisoning happens when attackers introduce vulnerabilities or alter a model’s behaviour by manipulating training or fine-tuning data. Until recently, it was often assumed that this would require control over a significant share of a model’s training data, implying that larger models trained on broader datasets would be harder to compromise.

Recent research challenges this assumption. Work published in 2025 by Anthropic, the UK AI Security Institute and the Alan Turing Institute found that a relatively small number of malicious documents (as few as 250) could be enough to introduce a backdoor into models of very different sizes. Researchers at Carnegie Mellon’s CyLab have similarly demonstrated that manipulating as little as 0.1 per cent of a model’s pre-training dataset is sufficient to launch effective data poisoning attacks.

In practice, this means that poisoned content can propagate through the AI supply chain, shaping the behaviour of downstream models even when the original model developer has not been directly compromised.

That can have serious consequences for the security of open-weight models. An attacker could seed a small number of poisoned public documents that would propagate into multiple downstream training runs and forks without access to the original developer’s pipeline.

Promising research by Microsoft’s AI Red Team has explored ways to detect backdoored models at scale after they have been trained and shared. Early techniques identify poisoned models by analysing behavioural signatures and links between backdoors and memorisation, pointing to a promising solution in a previously difficult-to-detect risk area.

However, simply demonstrating that poisoning is possible is not enough. Research to improve the detection of compromised models and to strengthen safeguards during training and fine-tuning would help. So would developing more practical methods for recovery when poisoning is suspected. Promising research techniques are emerging, but they are not yet reliable across all models and deployment settings. This is where coordinated action and international collaboration among universities, frontier labs and AI institutes would be particularly valuable.

What shared AI security could look like in practice

These three security priorities show that no country is likely to build the necessary evidence base, testing capacity and operational practices on its own. The more effective objective is therefore to strengthen the foundations of shared AI security: maturing best practices, advancing targeted research, building clearer expectations around deployment conditions and improving cross-country coordination in ways that support more secure adoption over time.

Practical progress can start by establishing building blocks that enhance interoperability and gradually boost the effectiveness of national efforts.

International efforts led through the G7 and the OECD – GPAI are well placed to advance this agenda through a few practical building blocks :

1. Shared benchmarks and testing environments are essential. Countries and research organisations require standardised methods to evaluate poisoning risks, agentic vulnerabilities, indirect prompt injections and resilience to jailbreaks across various models and deployment scenarios.
2. Better channels for information-sharing on vulnerabilities. AI-related vulnerabilities often do not align well with existing cyber-disclosure procedures. Enhancing AI security calls for reliable means for sharing exploit techniques, mitigations and lessons learned in ways that support both transparency and the secure handling of sensitive information.
3. Common reference points for secure design. International coordination can help align threat-modelling practices that clarify emerging failure modes, risk-management approaches that translate those risks into governance best practices and security standards for critical components and infrastructure, including model weights. Together, these can support more secure implementation in practice.
4. Enhanced public-private dialogue. AI security is evolving too quickly for governments, researchers and companies to work in isolation. Regular exchange channels can help policymakers understand emerging risks while giving researchers and firms clearer signals on where shared benchmarks, disclosure practices and secure design guidance are most needed.

AI institutes, including members of the AI Network for Advanced AI Measurement, Evaluation and Science, can help align evaluation priorities and testing methods. Universities and independent researchers can deepen the knowledge base in fast-moving domains where attack and defence techniques evolve rapidly. Cybersecurity authorities can help turn emerging lessons into operational practices for secure deployment, especially in higher-stakes environments.

These communities should invest in resources, tools, policies, and operational capabilities to assess how frontier AI might. speed up vulnerability discovery. Beginning with France’s G7 Presidency, the next immediate steps could facilitate closer alignment on key research and evaluation priorities and improve information-sharing channels to manage these risks effectively.

For nations aiming to expand AI throughout their economies, integrating security into AI development and deployment processes will be crucial to promoting AI diffusion and adoption. As new models develop stronger reasoning and coding capabilities, governments, researchers, and companies will need better ways to measure their capabilities and define limitations. That makes shared research roadmaps, stronger testing methods and practical security practices more urgent for trusted deployment.

The post Establishing the shared foundations for collective AI security appeared first on OECD.AI.

Across major economies, trustworthy artificial intelligence is rapidly moving from high-level policy to deployment in core industries such as health, manufacturing and mobility. The European Union is positioning itself for this shift by focusing not only on innovation capacity but also on trustworthy and coordinated implementation across its Member States. Gaining a deeper understanding of where AI is already being applied and gathering evidence on determinants of adoption are essential to assess Europe’s competitiveness and policy readiness.

The European Union is pursuing its ambition to become a global leader in trustworthy AI, moving from high-level policy to on-the-ground implementation. The OECD worked closely with the European AI Office to monitor efforts to develop trustworthy AI and promote its development across the European economy, with a two-volume publication series analysing how this transition is taking place in practice. The first volume focuses primarily on national strategies, initiatives and governance mechanisms for AI in EU Member States. The second, Progress in Implementing the European Union Coordinated Plan on Artificial Intelligence (Volume 2), shifts the lens to sector-specific impact.

The report supports efforts by the European Commission and EU Member States to promote the development, deployment, and use of AI technologies across priority sectors. It draws on extensive multi-stakeholder engagement, including semi-structured interviews with industry experts and insights from dedicated stakeholder workshops. It focuses on concrete use cases that address specific needs in agriculture, healthcare, manufacturing and mobility, selected high-impact sectors where AI can contribute to digitalisation, sustainability and economic resilience. These sectors are most prominently featured across national AI strategies (Figure 1) as priority sectors for AI applications.

Agriculture: from precision to sustainability

Globally, agricultural producers are increasingly turning to AI-enabled precision tools to address labour shortages, environmental pressures and resource constraints. Within Europe, similar dynamics are shaping experimentation with AI-supported farming systems aligned with environmental targets under the European Green Deal.

As AI-driven solutions help optimise resources, reduce chemical inputs and maintain yields, the EU’s agricultural sector is exploring AI deployment to address structural workforce shortages and sustainability requirements. AI-powered agricultural robots and crop and soil monitoring systems are playing a growing role in improving resource efficiency.

Robs4Crops, for instance, illustrates how computer vision and sensor-based systems can enable autonomous mechanical weeding and spraying in vineyards, crop fields and apple orchards. AI4SoilHealth, in turn, is developing an open-access, AI-driven digital infrastructure to help assess and monitor soil health metrics across Europe.

At the same time, many initiatives remain at pilot or experimental stages. Limited digital infrastructure in rural areas, fragmented and inaccessible datasets (due to the resources required to collect high-quality, diverse data across crops, soil, and livestock, and to limited interoperability of existing public datasets), financial barriers, and uncertainty over return on investment continue to constrain large-scale adoption.

Healthcare: enhancing diagnostics and operations

Health systems worldwide are using AI to improve diagnostic accuracy and manage increasing service demand. In Europe, demographic ageing and workforce shortages are strengthening the case for deploying AI across both clinical and operational settings.

AI can help address rising costs and workforce shortages in healthcare while improving patient outcomes through faster and more accurate diagnostics.

One of the most impactful use cases is AI-enhanced medical imaging for the early detection of conditions such as cancer, supported by initiatives including the European Cancer Imaging Initiative. Similar approaches are already being deployed in the United States and Japan, where AI-assisted radiology is helping reduce diagnostic backlogs, highlighting the strategic importance of scaling comparable capabilities across Europe.

Beyond clinical care, the report explores how AI is improving hospital operations. Predictive and optimisation AI systems can help forecast patient inflows and manage bed occupancy, helping healthcare providers reduce staff pressure and waiting times. Perplex, an EU-funded initiative, illustrates how AI can help automate and optimise scheduling and resource management in the outpatient department of a hospital in Madrid.

Despite this potential, barriers such as fragmented health data environments and trust challenges remain significant constraints.

Manufacturing: the rise of industrial intelligence

Competitiveness in the manufacturing sector increasingly depends on integrating AI into production systems, supply chains, and quality control processes. While other major economies are accelerating investment in smart factories, adoption across Europe remains uneven.

AI adoption in EU manufacturing remains modest and highly fragmented, with pharmaceuticals and electronics leading the way, while traditional industries such as textiles and food processing progress more slowly.

Despite these differences, there are areas where AI could have a substantial impact. The report highlights three priority use cases: predictive maintenance, quality assurance and control, and supply chain optimisation.

Predictive maintenance systems, such as those developed through the Made in Europe Partnership, analyse sensor data to forecast equipment failures and reduce costly downtime. In quality control, AI-powered inspection improves efficiency by identifying defects in real time. Comparable smart-manufacturing deployments in East Asia and the United States demonstrate how scaling such applications can strengthen productivity growth and industrial resilience.

Mobility: navigating toward a connected future

Transport systems are becoming increasingly data-driven as cities and logistics operators deploy AI to improve safety, efficiency and sustainability. Across Europe, mobility-sector deployment is closely linked to broader digital and climate transition strategies.

AI can help transport and mobility systems become safer, more efficient and more sustainable. AI-enabled traffic management systems, such as those explored in the AI4Cities project, can reduce congestion by dynamically adjusting traffic-light patterns. Automated driving technologies and intelligent freight logistics systems can further optimise routes and scheduling efficiency. Here, the EU Connected, Cooperative and Automated Mobility (CCAM) Partnership aims to accelerate the transition from research prototypes to real-world applications.

These developments are intended to align with the Sustainable and Smart Mobility Strategy, although gaps in infrastructure readiness and investment capacity remain important constraints for many operators.

Overcoming barriers to scale

Progress in Implementing the European Union Coordinated Plan on Artificial Intelligence (Volume 2) demonstrates significant sectoral potential for AI deployment, while identifying persistent bottlenecks that continue to slow implementation. Addressing these constraints will be critical to moving from experimentation with pilots to widespread deployment that fundamentally transforms the European economy for the better. To do so, the report puts forward a number of key recommendations, including the following:

• Focus on concrete sector-specific AI use cases

Targeted policies, investment, and collaboration will be essential to unlock AI’s full potential in key sectors of the EU’s economy. Public-private-academic partnerships, open innovation platforms, and cross-border collaborations can accelerate AI development and adoption, particularly when grounded in sector-specific needs. Focusing on concrete AI use cases, building ownership and trust through transparency and co-design with end-users, and demonstrating tangible benefits will be key to ensuring that AI strengthens Europe’s economic competitiveness, sustainability, and societal well-being.

• Strengthen data foundations

Investing in high-quality datasets, common standards and shared governance frameworks can enable secure, privacy-preserving data sharing across borders and sectors. Improving data representativeness and reducing fragmentation will lower entry barriers and support downstream AI adoption.

• Expand infrastructure and compute capacity
  Investments in broadband connectivity, cloud and edge computing, 5G networks and AI compute environments—including AI factories and high-performance computing centres—are essential to bridging regional gaps. Initiatives such as EuroHPC are helping ensure that economic actors, including SMEs, can access the computational resources required to train and deploy advanced AI models.

• Close the skills and talent gap
  Unlike their larger counterparts, who tend to have more resources at their disposal, smaller firms and public organisations require access to technical expertise and sector-specific training before large-scale deployment of AI becomes feasible. European Digital Innovation Hubs (EDIHs) are supporting this process through a “test before invest” approach that lowers adoption risks.

• Enhance trust and regulatory coordination
  Regulatory sandboxes allow firms to test innovative AI applications under supervisory conditions, enabling regulatory learning and improving compliance readiness before market entry. Providing clearer guidance and harmonising regulatory interpretation across Member States will remain particularly important for start-ups and SMEs operating under the EU AI Act, alongside relevant existing rules such as the GDPR.

Many of the report’s findings align with the European Commission’s Apply AI Strategy, which focuses strongly on accelerating adoption and the active deployment of AI across the economy. The OECD and the European Commission will continue working together to support implementation of the Strategy and to ensure that lessons from European AI deployment experiences contribute to the broader global AI policy community.

The authors would like to thank John Leo Tarver for his contributions to this report series and blog posts.

The post The European Union is deploying AI across strategic sectors   appeared first on OECD.AI.

In countries around the world, the public sector must ensure the trustworthiness of any algorithmic tools it wants to deploy by verifying that they function as intended, ensuring fair and acceptable use, and guaranteeing explainability of outputs.

Still, numerous high-profile incidents have emerged in which failing to consider one or more of these factors has led to undesirable events or outcomes in areas such as educational qualifications, social security, and debt. The truth is that the widespread use of AI is still new and much remains to be done to standardise approaches to safe deployment.

Nobody notices infrastructure until it fails

This is a common saying in the public sector. To this end, much of the important work in AI governance is routine day-to-day processes, guidance documentation, and activities within organisations that lead to the safety and responsible use critical for trustworthy AI.

The Algorithmic Transparency Recording Standard (ATRS) fits this description. It is a UK government initiative that establishes a standardised way for public sector organisations to publish information about how and why they use algorithmic tools.

In 2024, GPAI ran a project on Algorithmic transparency in the public sector, led by Juan David Gutierrez from Universidad de los Andes in Colombia and supported by CEIMIA (Centre d’Expertise International de Montréal en Intelligence Artificielle) – one of the three Centres of the GPAI Expert Community. The study reviewed global best practices and featured three case studies from Chile, the European Union and the UK. At its core, it explored why countries pursue such initiatives and how championing transparency can help avoid controversies and improve public trust. Before diving into the details of the standard, it is worth looking at a few cases that illustrate why such a standard is necessary.

A ‘mutant algorithm’, or just opaque?    

In the UK, one of the most high-profile controversies occurred in 2020, involving a school exam grading algorithm that estimated grades for students who did not sit formal exams due to COVID. The algorithm was subsequently found to unfairly benefit private school students while limiting test scores from publicly funded schools.  There are also several examples of opaque uses of algorithms within benefits systems. Australia’s ‘Robodebt’ scheme assessment programme fell under scrutiny for generating false debts, resulting in significant impacts on affected individuals. In Denmark, algorithms used by the country’s welfare agency have been the subject of reports of potential mass surveillance, discrimination and social scoring.

Beyond governments, equally high-profile cases have involved algorithms used in hiring systems or credit scoring that discriminated against people based on their gender, race or ethnicity.

Many of these controversies were exacerbated by the opacity of the algorithms used: certain impacts could have been reduced by proactively sharing information about tools and by working with the public and civil society during testing, development and implementation to identify risks ahead of deployment. The tools’ developers would have had the opportunity to engage with comprehensive information in the public domain, rather than relying on incorrect or incomplete information. This is all essential to ensure our emerging ‘algorithmic infrastructure’ stays ‘routine’, behind the scenes, and working as intended.

To address this, the UK government published the ATRS in November 2021. In a nutshell, ATRS provides a structured template and public repository to improve transparency, accountability and public trust by documenting how algorithmic tools work, their purpose, and their impact on decisions that affect citizens. In 2025, reporting the use of algorithms via the ATRS became mandatory for central government departments and Arms-Length Bodies (a specific classification of public bodies in the UK).

To build on the momentum, the government committed to the Roadmap for Modern Digital Government to compile and publish records of all identified in-scope algorithmic tools (as of March 2025) in government departments (excluding their associated public bodies) by the end of 2025. This was achieved, and at the time of writing, 125 ATRS records have been published, with more in progress.

International engagement and CEIMIA initiatives to improve ATRS

The Standard received international attention, with the OECD identifying it as a world-leading initiative and featuring it on the Observatory of Public Sector Innovation. In Europe, the Estonian government translated the Standard and piloted it as part of the UK-Estonia Tech Partnership, providing insights into how the Standard can be implemented across different jurisdictions.

Following the 2024 GPAI project on algorithmic transparency, the UK government’s Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (DSIT) entered into a partnership with CEIMIA under the brand of the Centres of the GPAI Expert Community to review the existing UK transparency standard and obtain rapid feedback as the standard continues to develop.  ATRS also benefits from input from a group of international experts, many of whom participated in the initial 2024 GPAI project. The results informed a set of recommendations, which the UK government is currently considering for a future update.

Testing the Standard through international partnerships, such as the one with Estonia and the Centres of the GPAI Expert Community, is a way for the UK to share best practices, a cornerstone of driving responsible data and AI practices globally.

Transparency and security must work together

Responsibility in a public technology context is often about striking a balance, which can require difficult trade-offs. Transparency matters, but so does security, especially in today’s geopolitically unstable environment.

How algorithms interact with and shape public life remains a major focus worldwide. One of the key themes at the India AI Impact Summit 2026 was Safe and Trusted AI, under which transparency was a specific concern, and the G7 could discuss it as a critical issue.

Transparency is essential for governments adopting algorithmic tools to enhance productivity and growth. Ensuring that it is a priority for public-sector organisations is an ongoing learning process. As the ATRS Standard gains wider recognition and adoption in the UK and beyond, DSIT continues to explore ways to improve it. Part of this involves researching how public-sector teams interact with the ATRS process and balancing security and safety considerations, including those related to cyber threats. 

In the end, all of this helps DSIT to create a healthy balance between maximising transparency – protecting citizens – and ensuring that digital government services remain safe and secure.

Get in touch!

Governments can contact the GPAI Centres of the GPAI Expert Community directly to receive help with algorithmic transparency: contact info@ceimia.org

The post Designing transparency for government AI: Insights from the UK’s Algorithmic Transparency Recording Standard initiative appeared first on OECD.AI.

The AI data paradox

As our daily activities become more digitised, from ordering dinner to receiving medical care, the amount of data produced by humans and machines continues to grow each year.  The internet provides a seemingly limitless flow of accessible data of all formats and natures, from news sites to social media. In early 2026, the internet archive initiative CommonCrawl boasted over 300 billion webpages in its database. Adding to this digital abundance, even larger volumes of data remain underused and locked in organisations’ private databases. Meanwhile, IBM reports that in 2024, the biggest challenge for AI developers was a shortage of high-quality data. This is the AI data paradox: despite an abundance of data globally, AI developers face a scarcity of usable data, with growing expert concerns about a looming data crunch as reported by the OECD (2025).

The new GPAI-associated report, From scraping to ethical data sharing, produced under the VIADUCT initiative, addresses this paradox. Based on 25 interviews and two multistakeholder workshops held in 2025, the report complements the OECD’s Recommendations on Enhancing Access to and Sharing of Data (EASD, 2019) and grounds its analysis in the concrete challenges faced by both data holders and AI developers when sharing and accessing data.

Scraped internet data as a key source for AI training

Data is the cornerstone of modern AI development, from model training to grounding. As online public content continues to grow, it has become a major source of training data for AI models. Initiatives such as CommonCrawl and LAION have harvested, or “scraped”, billions of online pages and images, ranging from news articles and government websites to blogs and social media. These datasets fuel rapid advances in AI tools, but also pose deep challenges.

Figure 1: The AI data value chain: From scraping data for reuse to content to generation

Contemporary AI requires contemporary data sourcing methods

As investment and revenue flow, AI has become a major industry, but data-sourcing methods have not kept pace. Many current AI processes still rely heavily on scraping large amounts of public content, often without permission, proper compensation or quality controls. But this “grab what you can” approach has limits. As the report documents, over 50 copyright and data protection lawsuits have been filed worldwide, while websites are increasingly deploying technical and contractual barriers to prevent scraping. At the same time, the web is increasingly saturated with low-quality material, including AI-generated “slop” and disinformation. Meanwhile, vast amounts of valuable data remain locked away on private servers because concerns about legal risk and confidentiality inhibit sharing.

These quality challenges and legal pressures point to the need for a new approach, one that moves beyond extraction towards mutually beneficial data-sharing arrangements, including commercial and non-commercial agreements as described in the OECD’s Mapping Relevant Data Collection Mechanisms for AI Training report (2025). Instead of relying on a single technical solution, the VIADUCT report presents data sourcing as a systemic challenge at the intersection of law, economics and technology. While data infrastructures have expanded significantly, experience shows that technical capacity alone does not initiate data flows.

Data sharing as a transaction

If not a simple engineering problem, then what is data sharing? At its most basic, data sharing is a transaction between two parties.

For common assets such as treasury bonds, Brent crude oil or soda cans, industry standards, regulations and institutions support transactions and build market trust. By contrast, data is not a standard asset. It is a collection of diverse assets that take different forms, with varying stakeholders and regulatory requirements. Consider two datasets: one with hospital patients’ X-rays, and another with archived news articles. The first dataset contains sensitive personal information protected under the GDPR in Europe and must comply with the principles of confidentiality and consent. News articles in the second dataset are copyrighted works whose owners can prohibit reproduction and opt out of AI training under EU law. These simple examples show that sharing data cannot rely on technology alone but must also consider a dataset’s economic, legal and social contexts and constraints.

Data is not monolithic

Government officials and business leaders often use metaphors like “raw material”, “new oil” and “gold” to describe data. However, contrary to what these metaphors suggest, data is not a uniform resource. In its EASD in the age of AI (2025), the OECD describes data as “recorded information in structured or unstructured formats, including texts, images, sound, and video”, which may also include AI models themselves when training data is memorised. On top of its diversity of shapes and formats, data is also a mosaic of digital assets, each governed by different rules, logic and constraints. Is one dealing with a copyrighted news article? Personal health records? A company’s trade secrets? Government statistics? Open source software code? Understanding this is essential to designing sustainable AI data ecosystems. Each type of data has its own legal guardrails, economic dynamics and technical challenges.

The VIADUCT report classifies data into five governance regimes according to the EU legal framework:

Figure 2: Data governance regimes under EU law

Governance model	Data scope	Dataset example
Copyrighted content	All creative works, including texts, images, videos, sounds, software source code and certain databases. Authors have exclusive rights to reproduce, communicate and distribute their works. They can also opt-out of commercial AI processing.	News article dataset, book archive, social media posts, music database
Personal data	Any data or information relating to an identified or identifiable individual (“data subject”). Under EU’s GDPR, a data processing, such as AI training, must be transparent, confidential, minimal and motivated by legal grounds such as data subject consent, or controller’s legitimate interest.	Customer history database, patients’ medical records, mobile phone GPS locations
Trade secrets	A dataset which is secret, is safeguarded and holds value due to its secrecy. Companies are protected against unlawful access, and can share trade secrets with third parties under strict safeguarding measures.	Engineering blueprint files, pharmaceutical molecule database, commercial lead database
Public sector data	Under EU law, public sector bodies must publish their documents for commercial and non-commercial reuse, free from exclusive license and without fee beyond cost compensation.	Texts of law, national statistics, national company registry
Open data	Any data which can be accessed, shared and used by anyone for any purpose, free of charge. In Europe, this may include contents with expired copyrights, government documents, and open-license content	19th century books, Wikipedia articles, open-source software code

Three guiding principles for sustainable and responsible approaches to data sharing for AI

In this diverse and complex environment, the report sets out three clear guiding principles that apply to all data types and governance regimes to foster sustainable and ethical data sharing for AI.

Legal compliance is the first principle. Data sharing and downstream use must respect applicable legal frameworks. In Europe, this includes honouring copyright holders’ rights, establishing legal grounds for the use of personal data and protecting confidential trade secrets.

The second is trust. Data holders need assurance that their data will be used only for permitted or legitimate purposes and protected by robust cybersecurity measures. Data consumers, in turn, need confidence that datasets are legitimate, accurate and of high quality.

The third principle is fairness. Data-sharing arrangements should be mutually beneficial, crediting organisations that support AI development and, where appropriate, sharing the benefits.

Figure 3: Ethical data sharing principles and best practices

Constraints for ethical data sharing

These principles sound simple, but applying them in practice is challenging. Exchanging large volumes of data requires expertise, which is often lacking in smaller organisations, and the process is fraught with technical, legal, and economic frictions. Data quality issues are a major source of friction, as errors, inappropriate content or bias can create risks and costs for downstream AI use. Ensuring data holders maintain control of their data after sharing or publishing is essential. This is referred to as digital self-determination. This is the case for personal data, copyrighted content or trade secrets, for which the data holder must often grant permission for each new processing act. EU law imposes strict confidentiality standards for personal data, trade secrets and sensitive government data. Finally, to incentivise data sharing and ensure its sustainability for data holders, implementing appropriate economic models such as cost and value compensation appears to be an essential solution.

Figure 4:  Ethical data sharing constraints

Transitioning to a multidisciplinary and implementation-focused approach

This non-exhaustive list of challenges illustrates the limits of relying only on normative or technical responses to address data-sharing constraints. The report investigates alternative approaches, such as opt-out methods, smart contracts, data attribution and privacy-enhancing technologies.

When it comes to ethical data sharing, moving from Is it possible? to How can we implement it? requires developing actionable tools and recommendations to address challenges. Given their diverse and context-sensitive nature, VIADUCT facilitates dialogue among data holders, AI developers, policymakers and researchers on concrete data-sharing projects and experiments. Ultimately, this exercise seeks to create a better understanding of the challenges for data sharing and promote and test innovative solutions at the crossroads of technology, economics and law.

The post Rethinking AI data: From scraping to sustainable and ethical data sharing appeared first on OECD.AI.

Participatory AI initiatives are meant to bring together diverse stakeholders to design and oversee AI systems that are fair and trustworthy. However, a recent review of 80 participatory AI initiatives revealed that, rather than providing participants with genuine decision-making power, the vast majority consult specific communities on narrow implementation details. 

Meanwhile, every major AI lab now conducts some form of public consultation, the EU AI Act requires stakeholder involvement, and the OECD AI Principles regard stakeholder engagement as a fundamental element of trustworthy AI. Participation in AI governance has become more popular than ever. But an uncomfortable pattern is emerging: the more we discuss participation, the less we discuss meaningful engagement, real influence and power.

Many participatory approaches primarily involve communities during the early stages of the AI system lifecycle: design, data collection, and model development, while later stages, such as deployment, monitoring and system evolution, attract far less attention. During my fieldwork across Kenya, Malawi, and the Philippines, a troubling question keeps surfacing: once the participatory design phase concludes, who truly governs the AI system? Even highly participatory processes often dissolve once the system is launched. Governance then shifts back to those who built or commissioned the system. Communities involved in shaping the design often have little influence over how systems evolve to meet ongoing community needs or how they expand beyond their initial scope.

The old lesson we keep relearning

Back in 1969, urban planner Sherry Arnstein published a deceptively simple insight: not all participation redistributes power. Her “ladder of citizen participation” described eight levels, from manipulation at the bottom to citizen control at the top. She called the middle rungs “tokenism”: processes that perform inclusion without actually transferring authority. Arnstein was writing about urban planning in American cities, but her framework resonates powerfully in today’s AI landscape.

Over fifty years later, AI researchers are revisiting this lesson. Recent studies have introduced the concept of “participation washing”: the act of claiming inclusion without the necessary redistribution of power. Other researchers have documented how participatory rhetoric often conceals the ongoing centralisation of decision-making authority.

These findings paint a consistent picture. Participatory AI, despite methodological progress, largely remains at Arnstein’s “consultation” and “informing” levels rather than reaching the “partnership” or “delegated power” levels. The reasons for this are understandable. Genuine participation is costly, slow, and fosters accountability relationships that complicate rapid development and deployment cycles. Organisations optimising for scale naturally minimise governance complexity. However, this means participatory AI often reproduces the very power imbalances it seeks to address.

The real divide: Methods versus infrastructure

Despite all this, the field has made genuine progress in developing methods to meaningfully involve people in AI design. The repository of tools and metrics on the OECD.AI Policy Observatory showcases participatory frameworks that now guide humanitarian and public sector AI initiatives globally. Methods have become increasingly sophisticated, moving beyond superficial consultation towards authentic co-design. What remains underdeveloped is the infrastructure for ongoing governance after deployment.

Think of it this way. Methods answer: “How do we involve people in design?” Infrastructure addresses: “How do people exercise authority after deployment?”

This distinction matters because AI systems, as the OECD definition emphasises, are adaptive. They are never “finished.” They evolve continuously through new training data, model updates, and deployment expansions. Each evolution requires governance decisions.

AI also relies on collective data. These are not tools that individuals choose to use; rather, they are infrastructure that processes communal information and makes decisions that affect entire populations. Without proper governance, participation during the design phase can inadvertently legitimise systems that centralise power. “We consulted the community” becomes a justification for deployment, even if communities no longer hold any authority over the system’s future.

What commons governance looks like in practice

If the challenge is institutional, what institutional forms could address it? One promising approach draws on principles from natural resource commons. Economist Elinor Ostrom received the Nobel Prize for demonstrating that communities can effectively manage shared resources such as fisheries, forests and irrigation systems. The application of commons governance to knowledge and digital resources has been extensively developed in later work, from Hess and Ostrom’s study of knowledge commons to comprehensive frameworks for analysing knowledge commons governance across various institutional contexts.

Commons governance models have several features that matter for AI: collective ownership, where communities hold rights to the resource; participatory decision making, where rules for usage and development are established through community processes; value sharing, where benefits are returned to the community; and continuous stewardship, where governance continues as long as the system operates.

The work I contribute to involves exploring whether these principles can guide AI system development in resource-limited settings. In Malawi, our research team at NYU and our local partners are creating a voice-based crisis reporting system designed to ensure that community governance councils oversee data practices, model updates, and deployment decisions. In the Philippines, we are collaborating with Kalinga State University on an Indigenous Knowledge Data Collaborative that allows communities to control how their traditional knowledge is digitised and used. The CARE Principles for Indigenous Data Governance, emphasising Collective benefit, Authority to control, Responsibility, and Ethics, offer a powerful framework here. These principles emerged from broader movements around Indigenous data sovereignty and represent a significant way to reshape data governance around community authority rather than external oversight.

While the OECD AI Principles mention data trusts as a mechanism for ethical data sharing, commons models take this logic further. Data trusts typically delegate authority to trustees acting on a community’s behalf. Commons models place community decision-making at the centre. The community does not transfer control to a benevolent intermediary; it retains authority itself.

Initiatives like Mozilla Common Voice and various Indigenous data-sovereignty movements are exploring this path worldwide, yet critical questions persist. Can commons governance operate effectively in resource-limited humanitarian settings? What occurs when commons governance moves too slowly for operational needs? Our fieldwork aims to address these exact questions.

What we are learning and what presents challenges

I want to be frank about the limitations of this work. These are early-stage experiments, not established models. However, they reveal important tensions that the wider field needs to address. If participatory AI governance is to go beyond words, we must be honest about what makes it challenging.

Power redistribution is costly. Governance meetings involve travel expenses, translation services, and participant compensation. In our work in Malawi, these costs are significant and surpass typical AI development budgets. However, this should be viewed not just as an expense but as an investment in risk mitigation. Without this investment, systems in complex environments risk rejection, non-adoption and even obsolescence.

Democracy is slow, and crises are urgent. Emergency responses demand quick decisions. Community governance takes time. The challenge is to differentiate between decisions that truly require rapid centralised action and those that only seem urgent to technical implementers.

“Community” is not uniform. Gender, age, and ethnicity influence who takes part and whose voice carries weight, and commons governance does not automatically resolve representation issues. However, it does make them visible and demands specific mechanisms to address them.

Sustainability remains uncertain because meaningful participation requires ongoing resources; governance cannot be an afterthought funded by short-term grants. It must be incorporated into budgets from the outset and treated as operational expenditure. International development finance models will need to adapt to support this. A system that works brilliantly for two years and then collapses because governance funding runs out is not a success.

What this means for AI policy

These experiments demonstrate methods to strengthen international frameworks for stakeholder engagement.

First, we need clearer distinctions between engagement levels. Consultative engagement involves gathering input to inform others’ decisions. Governance authority means stakeholders exercise binding power over system operation. Frameworks often conflate these two very different concepts. When a government or company says it has “engaged stakeholders,” does that mean it sought feedback or that it shared power? Making this distinction explicit helps implementers understand what they are truly committing to, and helps communities know what to expect.

Second, resource models need to change. Governance infrastructure, including ongoing meetings, capacity building, and conflict resolution, should be seen as a way to protect assets rather than as overhead. Current assessments of AI pilots rarely differentiate between technical and governance factors when a project fails. This complicates the process of allocating resources effectively. Funding structures must recognise that governance is the mechanism that maintains an AI system’s viability and trust over time.

Third, we need governance metrics. The OECD effectively monitors AI policy implementation. But we also need ways to measure the quality of power distribution. Who makes binding decisions about how a system evolves? Just as “technical debt” builds up when code is rushed, “governance debt” accumulates when engagement is overlooked. Eventually, the interest is paid in the form of lost trust or system failure. Recent work on AI accountability frameworks suggests promising directions for creating such assessments.

Finally, community data ownership has an unclear legal status in most jurisdictions. Cross-jurisdictional research on legal frameworks that support collective governance would be very valuable. Experiments such as New Zealand’s Māori data sovereignty frameworks and Barcelona’s data cooperatives offer promising models to learn from. The goal is not to impose universal frameworks but to document what works, what does not, and where the legal gaps are most severe.

Community governance authority as infrastructure

The participatory turn in AI governance represents genuine progress. However, involving people during design without engaging them in governance risks becoming a sophisticated form of consultation that maintains existing power structures. This is exactly what Arnstein warned against more than fifty years ago.

Moving from participation to power involves treating community governance authority as infrastructure: something that requires investment, upkeep, and institutional backing comparable to the technical systems it oversees. It means funding that supports governance alongside technical development. It means metrics that evaluate power distribution, not just engagement processes. And it means honest recognition that meaningful participation is slower and more costly than consultation, but also more likely to produce systems that communities genuinely trust and use over the long term.

Eighty participatory AI initiatives were reviewed, and most of them never moved beyond consultation. That finding should concern anyone who values participation. If we are serious about closing the gap between engagement and authority, we must start building the governance infrastructures to do it. AI remains in its early stages, and there is much we still need to understand. But one thing is becoming clear: if AI is considered infrastructure, it requires governance infrastructure. Otherwise, there is no trustworthy AI.

The international community has made significant progress in defining what responsible AI looks like. The next step is investing in the unglamorous, difficult, and necessary work of establishing governance structures to uphold these standards. This involves supporting communities not only as participants in design but also as equal partners in decision-making.

The post To be truly participative, stakeholder involvement should follow an AI system’s entire lifecycle appeared first on OECD.AI.

Among the various tools available to policymakers, regulatory sandboxes have gained considerable prominence in the AI governance landscape because they enable supervised innovation testing under controlled conditions and within limited timeframes. This can help to identify risks early, foster regulatory learning and refine regulatory requirements before they are applied at scale.

As AI regulatory sandboxes expand across jurisdictions and sectors, common design principles, recurring challenges and opportunities for greater effectiveness and policy coherence are emerging. As this happens, institutional co-operation and knowledge sharing are more important for ensuring coherent and effective regulatory experimentation both nationally and across borders.

In November 2025, the OECD webinar “AI Sandboxes: Sharing knowledge for success” brought together government officials, regulators and policy experts from seven countries to discuss the design and implementation of AI regulatory sandboxes. Here are the event’s key takeaways.

What is an ‘AI regulatory sandbox’?

Although there is no universally accepted definition, a regulatory sandbox generally offers temporary regulatory flexibility or waivers, allowing innovative products, services, or business models to be tested under controlled conditions and regulatory oversight. This approach promotes responsible experimentation and innovation while protecting the public interest.

To cite a few examples, Singapore’s AI healthcare sandbox offers guidelines for synthetic data to minimise privacy risks while allowing realistic testing. In the UK and other countries, AI-powered innovations in financial services are being tested under supervision that helps to prevent consumer harms such as biased scoring and automated decision-making. 

In AI, this approach aligns with the OECD AI Principles – specifically Principle 2.3, which encourages governments to promote experimentation to enable the safe testing and scaling of AI systems. Similarly, the Recommendation of the Council for Agile Regulatory Governance to Harness Innovation urges governments to facilitate greater experimentation, testing, and trialling to stimulate innovation under regulatory supervision.

AI regulatory sandboxes are valuable for testing new technologies and rules in a safe, controlled way before full rollout. They offer less benefit if risks are low or if rules are already well established, but can be useful for compliance and learning in more complex regulatory environments. Decisions to utilise sandboxes should follow clear criteria to ensure efforts are appropriately targeted. Generally, initiatives with high innovation potential, substantial risks, and opportunities for regulatory discovery and improvement (including by removing barriers to beneficial innovation) should be prioritised. Key regulators, industry actors and other relevant stakeholders should be involved in this process.

In July 2023, the OECD published the policy paper Regulatory Sandboxes in artificial intelligence. Building on lessons from fintech, the report highlights the benefits of AI sandboxes, including accelerating market entry, improving regulatory understanding, and stimulating investment. It also explains why adapting the traditional sandbox model to AI presents unique technical and governance challenges. As a cross-sectoral technology, AI covers multiple legal, ethical, and technical domains, requiring strong coordination among several regulatory authorities.

Since the paper’s release, the use of AI sandboxes has accelerated. By February 2025, the Datasphere Initiative identified over 60 sandboxes worldwide related to AI, data, and technology. Furthermore, key regulatory and policy frameworks, including the European Union’s AI Act and America’s AI Action Plan, view regulatory sandboxes as essential tools for fostering AI innovation and ensuring the safe development and adoption of AI.

Insights shared during the webinar by experts from Spain, Thailand, Luxembourg, Brazil, Korea, Israel and Singapore offer valuable lessons on how different jurisdictions design and operate AI sandboxes, highlighting what works, where challenges arise, and how approaches vary across contexts. For example, Spain provides appropriate, tailored guidance to ensure effectiveness and facilitate regulatory compliance further down the line. Brazil’s sequenced approach includes capacity-building to enable participants to contribute to effective experimentation and evaluation.

>> REVISIT THE WEBINAR AND RELATED PUBLICATIONS <<

Six insights about AI regulatory sandboxes from around the globe

1. AI sandboxes are not uniform

• According to the Datasphere Initiative, three primary types of sandboxes are emerging worldwide, especially within the context of AI. Regulatory sandboxes: Collaborative processes where regulators work with innovators to test innovations under regulatory supervision.
• Operational sandboxes: Testing environments and infrastructure where data can be hosted and accessed in controlled conditions.
• Hybrid models: Combining regulatory oversight with operational capabilities, sometimes offering infrastructure and operational spaces for testing and experimentation (e.g., “supercharged sandbox” in the UK).

These models intervene at different phases of the policy and regulatory lifecycle. Some are employed before formal regulation to identify gaps and suggest necessary updates. Others operate during the development process, supporting iterative regulatory design. Some focus on helping understand legal obligations and ensure regulatory compliance, such as under the EU AI Act. Sector-specific sandboxes are also common, with countries adopting different approaches depending on regulatory priorities and institutional settings. Across these models, regulatory waivers are frequently used to enable experimentation under regulatory supervision. 

Several experimentation-related initiatives, such as regulatory testbeds, living labs, or policy prototyping, share certain features and objectives with regulatory sandboxes. What truly distinguishes sandboxes is that they are the most institutionalised form of regulatory experimentation, usually led by regulators and integrated with regulatory supervision.

2. Coordination is essential

AI does not always fit neatly within existing sectoral, jurisdictional, or administrative boundaries. Its development and deployment span multiple regulatory domains, making effective coordination crucial. Luxembourg’s approach demonstrates this well, showing that AI sandboxes are more than testing spaces—they are platforms for regulatory collaboration and coordination. Luxembourg’s model brings together 11 authorities and innovation actors to align priorities and prevent fragmentation, emphasising the need for skilled project management alongside legal and technical expertise. 

Specific stakeholders within the AI ecosystem pursue different objectives: data protection authorities concentrate on privacy, cybersecurity authorities on resilience, and innovators on efficiency and speed. They also offer different kinds of expertise. Sandboxes can offer a neutral space to reconcile these priorities, fostering trust and mutual understanding. To achieve this, managing the expectations of involved parties and clearly defining the objectives of a sandbox are particularly important steps. 

In Thailand, a multi-faceted approach to AI regulatory sandboxing shows how balancing safety and flexibility depends on agile cooperation between sectoral regulators and industry. This approach integrates three complementary pathways: in the short term, fostering AI deployment where existing rules already allow it; in the medium term, establishing sector-specific sandboxes to manage domain-specific risks and opportunities; and eventually, developing system-wide sandboxes, including for government use, to test cross-cutting applications. Together, these mechanisms help promote AI-driven innovation within current legal frameworks while leveraging testing and experimentation to better understand the implications of emerging AI applications. Effective coordination is essential to prevent duplication of effort, regulatory gaps or conflicting rules.

Sandboxes can also play a valuable role in involving expert and academic communities in the development of AI regulation, with countries such as Spain, Luxembourg, and Brazil benefiting from such expertise at multiple stages of sandbox design and operation.

3. From policy to practice, and back again

AI sandboxes are increasingly used to bridge the gap between regulatory frameworks and real-world implementation. For example, Spain’s regulatory sandbox pilot translates the EU AI Act’s requirements for high-risk AI applications into practical compliance steps, enabling early identification of gaps and clarifying obligations for deployers. In December 2025, the Spanish AI Supervision Agency (AESIA) published a series of introductory and technical resources, developed from insights gathered during the regulatory sandbox pilot, that demonstrate how sandboxes can support evidence-based compliance guidance. Luxembourg’s AI sandbox, in turn, acts as a coordination platform to ensure lessons learned on overlapping obligations feed into the domestic operationalisation of the EU AI Act and related future guidance.

In July 2025, Singapore launched its Global AI Assurance Sandbox, building on insights from a previous pilot phase, to create a testing environment where creators or deployers of GenAI applications can have their applications evaluated by expert technical testers. Key risk aspects examined during testing include hallucination, undesirable content, data leakage, and vulnerability to adversarial prompts, with the findings informing policy guidance. Brazil’s Regulatory Sandbox on AI and Data Protection also exemplifies this trend. It aims to promote transparency, privacy by design and responsible innovation in AI systems that handle personal data, using structured experimentation to help innovators achieve regulatory compliance and assist regulators in understanding how rules work in practice and where adjustments may be necessary.

Simultaneously, AI sandboxes continue to shape future regulatory frameworks. In Thailand, sector-specific sandboxes for digital payments, digital assets, banking and insurance are expected to help regulators understand real-world AI applications and prepare for system-wide governance. As sandboxes move regulation from theory to practice and back to policy, they create an iterative loop that can strengthen trust and adaptability in AI governance. To achieve this, sandboxes should generate insights to inform better regulation. This, in turn, requires consistent reporting, sharing of results, and the establishment of feedback loops across sectors and countries to boost compliance and policy development.

Nevertheless, translating sandbox results into regulatory improvements remains challenging, even in countries like Korea, which has considerable experience conducting regulatory experiments across sectors.

4. Incentives matter

Participation in AI sandboxes is not automatic. Clear and well-designed incentives are essential for both innovators and regulators. Israel, for instance, has introduced a government fund that provides financial support, legal counselling and mentorship for regulators launching AI sandboxes, while also offering grants to participating firms. Similarly, Singapore reduces testing-related barriers to GenAI adoption through practical guidance and access to specialised testing partners.

These models recognise a fundamental challenge: AI experimentation is resource-intensive and needs to focus on areas where it matters most. Without targeted support, regulators may struggle to operate sandboxes, and companies might be hesitant to participate. Furthermore, when offering incentives, authorities should encourage a diverse mix of participants—small firms, big players, different sectors, and different AI applications—to ensure that sandbox insights are both representative and robust. The complex nature of regulatory sandboxes themselves may also pose challenges for some applicants or even participants. In this context, Brazil outlined a three-stage execution framework, starting with capacity building for selected participants undertaken by a partner university, before advancing to the experimentation and evaluation phases. 

5. The growing need for interoperability and cross-border collaboration

As AI systems operate across borders, there is a growing need for AI sandboxes to extend beyond national borders. Without international coordination, firms may engage in ‘jurisdiction hopping’, seeking the most permissive regulatory environments. Interoperability between sandboxes is thus becoming a governance necessity. Cross-border collaboration is also crucial for international regulatory cooperation. In Brazil’s case, preparatory work to develop the sandbox included international consultations on the experimental methodology. This approach enables the benefit from international practices and standards and facilitates the sharing of experiences in later stages of the project. 

Cross-border sandboxes have already proven their worth. Singapore’s Global AI Assurance Pilot, for example, involved 17 AI deployers from nine countries collaborating with 16 specialised testers from the US, UK and Europe. Use cases include summarisation, chatbots to AI applications in healthcare, finance and human resource management. These cross-border tests allowed regulators and companies to understand how AI performs in different legal, cultural and technical environments. For example, a chatbot that safely managed English queries inadvertently leaked confidential information when prompted in Mandarin, demonstrating the importance of multilingual testing. 

6. AI sandboxes come with challenges of their own

AI sandboxes face several challenges. Regulators often encounter capacity limitations and lack the technical expertise or project management skills necessary to supervise complex AI systems. Fragmentation and coordination issues also arise, as AI spans multiple sectors and necessitates collaboration among numerous authorities, including across borders. 

Designing suitable requirements and safeguards for sandbox frameworks can be challenging, especially when multiple regulatory regimes are involved, as demonstrated by Brazil. Deciding the appropriate level of transparency, human oversight, and data governance can be particularly difficult when firms seek waivers to speed up testing.

At the same time, Korea’s experience demonstrates that although safety and consumer protection rules are vital, excessively strict requirements may deter participation, especially among SMEs, and hinder experimentation. Safeguards should therefore be proportionate to and aligned with the risks posed by the technology, as overly complex procedures can undermine the agility required in regulatory sandboxes in a rapidly evolving AI landscape.

Measuring the impact of AI sandboxes is also difficult. Without clear metrics, sandboxes risk becoming isolated experiments rather than influential policy tools. Ideally, impact should be monitored across various areas, such as faster time-to-market for compliant AI systems, increased regulatory clarity and coherence (including through less fragmentation), and tangible updates to laws and standards shaped by sandbox insights. 

Furthermore, as highlighted in a 2024 OECD policy paper, there are potential limitations concerning legality, feasibility, resources, and equity. Regulatory experiments should adhere to constitutional norms, including those concerning equal treatment.

A vital element for responsible innovation and public trust?

As a relatively new regulatory tool designed to address a rapidly evolving general-purpose technology, AI sandboxes raise significant questions about their role. Some of the questions raised during the online workshop include:

• What role might civil society play in AI sandboxing?
• How can public institutions build the expertise required to supervise regulatory sandboxes involving frontier-level AI systems?
• How can sandboxes balance flexibility with protecting long-term societal values (e.g., what types of safeguards should be in place regarding regulatory exemptions)?
• What measures, such as reporting and documentation requirements, talent management, and capacity building, are necessary to ensure transparency and build trust in AI regulatory sandboxes? 

As AI governance develops and these questions are addressed, AI sandboxes hold the potential to become key tools for promoting responsible innovation, enhancing governance and building public trust in AI systems across the globe. 

The OECD is well placed to advance these objectives by facilitating the systematic exchange of knowledge and expertise, and by developing standardised, comparable frameworks for measuring outcomes. It can also use its convening role to support alignment on guidance for the targeting, design and implementation of AI regulatory sandboxes. By grounding this work in empirical evidence and practical experience, the OECD can help strengthen the overall evidence base and inform more effective policy approaches.

The authors would like to thank Natalie Cohen, Lucia Russo, Guillermo Hernandez, Xavier Pearson, Viktor Samek and John Leo Tarver for their contributions to this piece.

The post Why AI Sandboxes matter for responsible innovation and public trust appeared first on OECD.AI.

AI agents and agentic AI based on large language models are becoming more autonomous and capable of interacting with both physical and virtual environments. As the capabilities of these AI systems grow, they are gaining visibility, and with reason. It is reaching a point where they could become the driving force behind innovation, investment and improved productivity across sectors by streamlining processes and enabling more efficient operations.

While ideas related to agency have long been explored in academic research in fields such as philosophy, economics and computer science, recent advances in AI are stretching conceptual boundaries. As AI’s capabilities evolve, so do our shared understanding of what qualifies as AI agent and agentic AI.

The OECD report, The agentic AI landscape and its conceptual foundations, developed by the OECD.AI Expert Group on Agentic AI, helps clarify what AI agents and agentic AI are and how they differ. Grounded in the OECD AI system definition, the analysis examines how these terms are defined and used across the literature. By analysing key features, overlaps and distinctions and mapping them to the core elements of the OECD definition of an AI system, the report helps to establish more precise and consistent terminology. And in a rapidly evolving field, conceptual precision is essential for effective, well-informed governance.

Three key messages stand out in the report:

• AI agents and agentic AI are closely related, but not interchangeable.
• Agentic AI ought to be seen as a socio-technical paradigm.
• Despite technological gaps and varying levels of maturity in areas such as digital security and privacy, uptake is growing.

The common foundations and meaningful distinctions of AI agents and agentic AI

Our analysis shows that AI agents and agentic AI share foundational characteristics. Both involve systems with a degree of autonomy that pursue goals and can perceive and act within physical and virtual environments.

However, there are differences that mean these terms are not interchangeable.

1. AI agents can be understood as systems that perceive and act on their environment with a degree of autonomy, using tools as needed to achieve specific goals and adapt to changing inputs and contexts.
2. By contrast, agentic AI generally refers to systems composed of multiple co-ordinated AI agents that can break down tasks, collaborate and pursue complex objectives autonomously over extended periods. Agentic AI systems are designed to operate in more open-ended, less predictable physical and virtual environments, and to function with minimal human supervision.

In short, agentic AI is more complex, as it can co-ordinate multiple agents, perform task decomposition and delegation, and sustain operations over longer periods. It can also operate in more complex, less predictable environments with limited human oversight.

Agentic AI as a socio-technical paradigm

Agentic AI systems are not isolated technical artefacts. They are frequently embedded in social contexts and interactions and operate within a socio-technical paradigm.

Their value lies not only in autonomous action, but in interaction with other AI agents, humans and institutional processes. Co-ordination and negotiation across these actors require advanced reasoning capabilities, robust infrastructure and reliable communication protocols.

This relational perspective is an essential part of what agentic AI is. This means that understanding how they interact within broader ecosystems is essential to designing agentic AI systems that function responsibly and effectively, particularly in open or high-stakes environments.

Uptake is accelerating, but maturity is uneven

The report also presents descriptive evidence on trends in AI agent adoption. Many developers have already integrated them into their toolkits, and survey data indicate that nearly half of respondents on Stack Overflow use them or plan to do so.

To be clear, adoption should not be confused with maturity. Developers highlight opportunities to further strengthen the security, privacy and accuracy of AI agents. These concerns underscore an important point: as the capabilities of agentic AI advance rapidly, progress in robust, trustworthy AI systems must keep pace.

A foundation for further analysis

Overall, the report provides a descriptive overview of the agentic AI landscape, clarifying key concepts and characteristics and establishing a shared analytical foundation. By anchoring the discussion in the OECD AI system definition, it aims to promote coherence across technical and policy communities.

Looking ahead, an improved understanding of real-world use will be essential to identify where safeguards, standards, and governance mechanisms will be most effective. Policy-relevant typologies that build upon this work could help guide governance efforts to distinguish systems by level of autonomy, degree of adaptiveness, domain of operation and scale of impact. Evidence-based policymaking will require more empirical data on how AI agents and agentic AI are being adopted and used across sectors, as well as clearer evidence of their broader implications and impacts.

This report contributes to a clearer, shared understanding of agentic AI and provides a basis for thoughtful, forward-looking policy grounded in conceptual clarity. As agentic AI systems become more capable of coordinating multiple AI agents, taking action and operating over longer periods, governance conversations have to keep pace.

The post Can we create a clear understanding of what agentic AI is and does? appeared first on OECD.AI.

Companies hoping to take advantage of AI’s opportunities need to be trustworthy. Whether investing in, developing, or using AI, the OECD’s new Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible AI provides businesses with an internationally agreed, government-backed tool to demonstrate that markets and societies can trust their AI systems.   

Recent international reporting underscores a growing consensus: AI is not just a technological shift. It is a major geopolitical, economic, and societal phenomenon that demands coordinated action amongst all actors, including companies. 

AI has the potential to transform society through productivity, economic value and solutions to complex challenges, but for these benefits to materialise, AI needs trust.  So far, the technology seems to advance faster than its guardrails. The gap between AI systems and appropriate safeguards is now one of the defining challenges for policymakers and global businesses alike. Both are under pressure to balance AI innovation and diffusion with safety and risk management. Success depends on getting the balance right.

Risks throughout the AI value chain are continually evolving

Risks to people and the environment can manifest at any point along the AI value chain. The OECD actively tracks and categorises risks through its AI Incidents and Hazards Monitor.

Here are a few examples. At one end of the AI value chain, there are the people who label, clean, and moderate the vast datasets required to train AI models. They can face low wages, long hours, and suffer psychological distress from exposure to harmful content. Companies need to ensure decent work for data enrichment workers.

The environmental costs of running AI systems can also be significant, particularly for energy and water consumption by data centres that power AI development and deployment, which may lead to higher energy prices.

Data privacy is another critical concern. AI models are trained on massive datasets that may include personal or sensitive information. If these datasets are not properly anonymised and secured, it can lead to data breaches. If AI models “memorise” and reproduce sensitive data in their outputs, they can expose confidential details, creating legal and ethical dilemmas.

At the other end of the AI value chain, the potential for AI misuse poses risks such as reputational harm and the spread of misinformation. AI-generated deepfakes, for instance, can be used to create realistic but fabricated content, damaging reputations or manipulating public opinion. Similarly, AI can be used to generate and disseminate mis and dis-information at speed and scale, eroding trust in institutions and potentially influencing events.

Worldwide, governments, consumers, and markets are calling for responsible and trustworthy AI. This is one of the reasons for the surge in mandatory and voluntary AI risk management frameworks, responsible AI initiatives, global agreements, academic research and statements from industry leaders and investors. However, this surge in frameworks is also increasing complexity for companies, as risk management is defined differently across jurisdictions and understanding of AI-related risks is evolving.

OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible AI: A flexible, whole-of-value-chain approach to support businesses in navigating evolving risks and rules

This is why the OECD has now developed the first internationally agreed, government-backed Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible AI. Backed by all the OECD’s member countries, plus 17 partner governments and the EU, this Guidance helps enterprises navigate the complex terrain of AI risk management. It is designed to help businesses ensure that the AI systems they develop are trustworthy, used and developed safely and responsibly, and aligned with broad societal values.

Concretely, this Guidance offers:

• A step-by-step framework for enterprises to set up internal management systems capable of proactively identifying and responding to risks related to human rights, labour standards, and environmental impacts.
• Comprehensive coverage of all risk areas from the leading international standards that it is built on and reflects, notably, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises on Responsible Business Conduct (MNE Guidelines) and the OECD Recommendation on Artificial Intelligence (AI Principles);
• Recommendations and implementation examples for everyone in the AI value chain, from data suppliers and infrastructure providers to financiers and end-users – including enterprises. The guidance emphasises a “whole-of-value-chain” approach to support secure and resilient AI value chains more resistant to supply chain shocks and interference.
• A roadmap of related provisions in existing frameworks, indicating how each step complements and relates to relevant provisions from AI risk management frameworks. This feature helps enterprises understand how implementing this guidance can help them meet expectations from multiple sources and navigate the current landscape of AI risk management frameworks.

Responsibility and trust can give a competitive edge

Responsibility and innovation not only coexist but also reinforce each other. Companies that show a commitment to responsible AI and actively address potential risks can gain trust from investors, customers, regulators, and policymakers. This trust leads to a competitive edge. Instead of hindering innovation, responsible AI practices can speed up growth by reducing obstacles and preventing costly damage to reputation, legal issues, and society.

Responsible and trustworthy AI is becoming increasingly crucial for accessing global markets as international regulatory and voluntary risk management frameworks evolve. Companies in the AI value chain that meaningfully implement the Guidance’s recommendations can position themselves advantageously for cross-border expansion, potentially avoiding the substantial costs of retrofitting systems to meet various regional requirements.

As AI continues to develop rapidly, frameworks and best practices for responsible AI are likely to evolve as well. To help stakeholders keep pace, the OECD will launch an online navigation tool later this year with updates on new frameworks and use cases.

The post The OECD’s new responsible AI guidance: A compass for businesses in a complex terrain appeared first on OECD.AI.

The India AI Impact Summit 2026 convenes at a moment of accelerated AI deployment. Governments and industry leaders are moving beyond experimentation toward integrating advanced AI systems across strategic sectors, consumer services and public administration. At the same time, major technology firms are advancing increasingly autonomous, task-oriented AI “agents”, thereby enriching the policy conversation and focusing it more on the technology’s real-world operationalisation.

In this context, the Summit reflects a broader global trend toward large-scale implementation. This shift aligns with ongoing OECD work on monitoring AI incidents and hazards, supporting the operationalisation of the OECD AI Principles, and measuring AI diffusion and understanding patterns of adoption.

The OECD and its Global Partnership on AI (GPAI) are engaged across the Summit’s agenda, working with India and other partners to translate years of analysis, data and policy frameworks into tools that policymakers can use in practice to have real impact.

>>> Visit OECD.AI’s India Summit agenda<<<

The OECD at the India AI Impact Summit

Across the summit, the OECD will support this pragmatic approach with a series of events and deliverables. Details for the specific times and locations can be found on our main event webpage:

• Advancing AI transparency in practice
   17 February, 11:30 – 12:25 (IST) West Wing Room 4, Bharat Mandapam Convention Centre
  WATCH THE LIVE STREAM
  Co-hosted by the OECD, Japan’s Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Infosys and Microsoft, this discussion will explore how to align national and regional policy frameworks with shared expectations for transparency, safety, and accountability. Anchored in the Hiroshima AI reporting framework for advanced AI systems, the discussion will explore how common reporting practices, risk disclosures, and transparency mechanisms can support both national policy objectives and cross-border trust.  Participants will discuss how voluntary frameworks, such as international reporting templates, assurance mechanisms, public–private collaboration on testing and evaluation, can complement national policies by enabling faster learning cycles, supporting innovation, and fostering convergence where it matters most for safety and rights.
• Democratising trust: Open source tooling for safe, secure and trustworthy AI
   17 February, 13:30 – 14:25 (IST) Room 9, Bharat Mandapam Convention Centre
  WATCH THE LIVE STREAM
  Co-hosted by the OECD, the India AI Impact Summit, Mozilla Foundation, ROOST, the UK AI Security Institute, and Mistral AI, this panel will explore the practical landscape of open-source tooling for trustworthy AI. Our experts will: Take stock of the current open-source tooling ecosystem and highlight key gaps and challenges. Showcase open-source tools that enable both technical and non-technical stakeholders to monitor and assess AI safety, security, and trustworthiness. Examine how open-source approaches can help build capacity in underrepresented regions and communities. Present the OECD.AI Catalogue of Tools and Metrics for Trustworthy AI and launch an open call for submissions of open-source tools, inviting AI practitioners worldwide to contribute.
• AI for inclusive and resilient food systems
   20 February 2026, 14.30 – 15.30 (IST) Room 18, Bharat Mandapam Convention Centre
  WATCH THE LIVE STREAM
  The Government of the Netherlands and the OECD will co-host a flagship event on AI for inclusive and resilient food systems, with the participation of H.E. Mr. Harry Verweij, Ambassador at Large and Special Envoy AI for the Kingdom of the Netherlands and H.E. Mr. Nezar Patria, Vice Minister of Communications and Digital Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, among other distinguished speakers.
  This session leverages the work of the India AI Impact Summit Working Group on Economic Growth and Social Good, co-chaired by the Netherlands and Indonesia. It explores how AI can support the transition to more transparent, responsible, and inclusive agricultural production and distribution within food systems. Discussions will draw on national initiatives and concrete use cases to highlight practical, scalable approaches to improving data sharing, interoperability, risk management, and access to high-quality agricultural data.

• GPAI Ministerial Council Meeting
  EVENT CLOSED TO THE PUBLIC
   20 February, 10:00 – 12:30 (IST) Summit Room, Bharat Mandapam Convention Centre
  The India AI Impact Summit will host the GPAI Council Meeting at Ministerial Level, bringing together ministers and senior representatives from GPAI members, partners and stakeholders.The ministerial meeting will provide a forum to advance GPAI’s mission to promote human-centric, safe, secure, and trustworthy AI, grounded in the OECD Recommendation on AI. Discussions will focus on shaping GPAI’s strategic direction and strengthening international collaboration amid rapid technological change.

People, planet and progress: India’s AI moment

Indian authorities and organisers frame the Summit around three pillars: People, Planet and Progress. The emphasis is on ensuring that accelerated adoption translates into inclusive growth, environmental sustainability and tangible public value.

A central theme is delivery. Discussions are expected to focus on how governments can move from strategy documents to implementation through institutional capacity building, interoperable data systems, procurement reform and accountability mechanisms. These priorities resonate with OECD work, highlighting the importance of governance frameworks that enable innovation while safeguarding rights and public trust.

Some potential outcomes from the India AI Summit

Against this backdrop of rapid adoption, infrastructure development and evolving governance challenges, the OECD’s contribution focuses on evidence, measurement and international co-operation. Through data, policy tools and a multi-stakeholder convening role, the OECD supports countries in translating ambition into accountable and inclusive AI deployment.

The success of the India AI Impact Summit could help governments to clarify answers to practical questions: how to deploy AI responsibly in public services, how to develop AI skills at scale, how to manage risks and incidents, and how to ensure AI contributes to sustainable development rather than undermining it.

Most importantly, it should help rebalance the global AI conversation. By placing everyday impact and responsibility at the forefront, the Summit recognises that the future of AI will be shaped not only in research labs and boardrooms, but also in classrooms, clinics, farms, and public administrations around the world.

Join us in Delhi

The OECD looks forward to working with India and international partners to make the India AI Impact Summit a milestone for global AI governance. We invite readers to visit the OECD.AI India AI Impact Summit agenda page to track all of our activities and engage with the discussions as they unfold.

Turning principles into practice is not easy. But it is essential. And in New Delhi this February, we have a real opportunity to move the global AI agenda forward together.

The post Turning AI ambition into action: How the OECD is engaging at India’s AI Impact Summit appeared first on OECD.AI.

Artificial intelligence is changing fast, and the world is feeling both excited and uneasy about it. People use AI tools every day in hospitals, classrooms, companies and public services, yet the rules that guide these tools are still developing. Many governments are trying to find a balance between innovation and safety. Others are trying to make sure that AI actually improves people’s lives without widening gaps.

This is the backdrop against which the India AI Impact Summit 2026 will take place in New Delhi in February. Earlier global AI meetings, including the 2023 gathering at Bletchley Park and subsequent summits in Asia and Europe, helped define the risks and push for action.

These summits did not occur in isolation but are part of broader global efforts to coordinate responsible approaches to AI. The G7 Hiroshima Process in 2023–24 established a shared commitment to trustworthy, human-centric AI, leading to the adoption of the Hiroshima Declaration, which calls for international cooperation on safety, transparency, and risk mitigation.

Building on that, the Paris AI Summit in 2025 moved the conversation toward implementation, with an early agreement on safety evaluations, incident-reporting mechanisms and commitments to support countries with limited technical capacity. The India AI Action Summit represents the next step in this progression: translating these collective principles into measurable on-the-ground outcomes.

In recent months, people have repeatedly asked me two questions. Why should India host such a major global meeting? And is this summit actually useful for India and the world?

The simple answer here is that the next phase of AI will not be decided by a small number of companies or countries. It will depend on whether billions of people, especially in the Global South, can use AI safely, affordably and accountably. India, with its linguistic diversity, strong digital public infrastructure and experience deploying technology at a population scale, is well positioned to help shape this practical phase.

However, AI comes with challenges related to privacy, digital exclusion and the balance between innovation and oversight. But these very tensions make India’s experience pertinent to other countries facing the same trade-offs.

This blog post explains why that matters, what the international community can expect in Delhi, and how we should measure progress at the end of the summit.

Why India, and why now

AI deployment in the Global South will shape global outcomes

Much of the world’s discussion on AI has focused on frontier models, international competition and long-term safety. These debates are important, but AI’s greatest impact will be felt in how it reaches ordinary people. From farmers and students to small businesses, frontline health workers and local governments.

More than half of the world’s population lives in countries categorised as the Global South — a term first popularised in the late 1960s to describe post-colonial economies, and one I don’t fully agree with, as it often flattens diverse countries into a single broad category.

If AI is to be truly global, it must work for multilingual, resource-constrained and diverse environments. This includes reliable translations, culturally grounded datasets, accessible interfaces and low-cost deployments. It also means designing systems that respect human rights and democratic norms even in places with limited regulatory capacity.

India sits at the intersection of these challenges. With over a billion people, 22 official languages and thousands of dialects, any technology deployed at scale must be inclusive by design. India’s experience offers lessons for many other countries navigating the same realities.

India has a strong track record in large-scale digital public infrastructure

India’s digital public infrastructure, or DPI, is one of the most widely referenced success stories of how technology can enable access and accountability. Systems like Aadhaar, UPI and DigiLocker have helped millions access identification, financial services and digital records. These platforms were built with interoperability and openness in mind, which has led to a wave of public and private innovations.

At the same time, these systems have also raised important questions about privacy, data security, and exclusion of marginalised communities who lack documentation or digital access. India’s ongoing work to address these concerns—through data protection legislation, improved grievance mechanisms, and efforts to reach the digitally excluded—provides practical lessons about implementation challenges that other countries will inevitably face.

The India AI Impact Summit is expected to draw on this experience, including both successes and areas for improvement. The global community is watching to see how India will frame the link between AI and digital public goods, and how these tools can be used responsibly in sectors such as education, healthcare and social protection.

International expectations are focusing on implementation leadership

The earlier global AI safety and governance summits created momentum. They helped identify risks, promote transparency and encourage cooperation. But now, many countries and organisations want clarity on what should happen next.

The India summit is an opportunity to shift the conversation from what AI might do to what it should deliver. This includes measurable improvements in public services, clearer accountability mechanisms and more inclusive access to AI tools. By focusing on implementation, India can complement the work of the OECD-GPAI, UNESCO and other international bodies.

 What the India AI Impact Summit should prioritise

A conversation about measurable, real-world outcomes

The summit should begin by asking a straightforward question: What changes on the ground when AI is deployed responsibly at scale? To answer it, discussions need to move beyond broad aspirations and focus on concrete domains like public healthcare triage, classroom support tools, agricultural advisory systems, and other public-sector applications where impact can be seen and measured.

Government delegates should be encouraged to present evidence, not statements of intent. That means clear baselines, transparent evaluation methods, and metrics that reflect real improvements: higher diagnostic accuracy, increased crop yields and shorter benefit-processing times all achieved without compromising fairness or human oversight.

If the summit succeeds, it will shift the global conversation toward what works, for whom, and under what conditions.

Three ways the Global South can shape the international agenda

A meaningful summit requires a wide range of voices—especially from regions where AI deployment will shape social and economic outcomes for decades to come. Countries across Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Middle East bring their lived experiences of linguistic diversity, data scarcity, affordability constraints and uneven digital access.

The summit should create space for these countries to set priorities rather than simply respond to frameworks developed elsewhere. Their perspectives are vital for building governance models that reflect the realities of low-resource contexts, rather than idealised assumptions from high-income environments.

A more pluralistic conversation would reinforce a simple principle: responsible AI cannot be universal if it is not also contextual.

Rebalancing the narrative with the immediate societal, environmental and institutional challenges

One of the most important roles the summit can play is to broaden the global AI discourse. Today, existential risk narratives dominate many international forums, often overshadowing more immediate and systemic issues. The India AI Impact Summit should refocus attention on the present: AI’s energy footprint, labour displacement, rising misinformation, digital exclusion and the growing pressure on public institutions to oversee algorithmic systems they are not adequately equipped to oversee.

The environmental dimension deserves particular attention. Training and deploying large AI models require significant energy resources, disproportionately affecting the Global South. Many of these countries face climate vulnerability, fragile grids and competing development priorities. For regions already grappling with heatwaves, droughts and energy shortages, the cost of “AI at scale” cannot be separated from broader planetary concerns. If AI is to be deployed responsibly, discussions must also consider energy and natural resource efficiency and equitable access to compute.

These issues determine how people experience AI today and whether they trust it tomorrow. Giving them equal weight would help correct the imbalance in global discussions and lead to governance that addresses risks people actually face, not only those imagined at the far horizon.

Potential wins for the India AI Impact Summit

Practical pathways for responsible public-sector deployment

Across sectors, governments are eager to use AI to strengthen healthcare, expand access to education and streamline welfare delivery. Yet many lack clarity on how to procure, evaluate or oversee these systems responsibly. A meaningful outcome of the summit would be simple, actionable pathways that public agencies can adopt without specialised expertise. These might take the form of evaluation checklists with acceptable error and bias thresholds, procurement templates with human oversight requirements, or clear guidance on when and how officials should override an AI recommendation. Transparent case studies and training for civil servants would also help countries move from hesitation to informed, confident experimentation.

Strengthened mechanisms for trust and accountability

Concerns about misinformation, bias, privacy and security continue to rise, and many countries, particularly those with limited technical capacity, need practical tools to manage these risks. The summit could make a real contribution by advancing shared approaches to incident reporting, auditing and assurance, as well as safety testing methods that work across varied deployment contexts. Small pilot frameworks would help establish a common baseline of accountability. Such efforts would not only support global cooperation but also build public trust at a time when many citizens and policymakers remain uncertain about the reliability of AI systems.

Broader cooperation on multilingual and inclusive AI with robust safety infrastructure

Many countries struggle with adapting AI to their unique linguistic profiles. India’s long-standing work in language technologies positions it to convene collaborations on multilingual and inclusive AI. New partnerships on datasets, dialect-specific models, local-first interfaces and research on linguistic bias could meaningfully expand access for millions of people worldwide.

But inclusion must be matched with safeguards. As AI tools become more widely available, countries will need parallel investments in risk-assessment expertise, regional coordination on harmful content and support for the development of first-generation regulatory frameworks. Striking the right balance between openness and safety would reinforce core OECD AI Principles and help ensure expanded access does not bring greater vulnerability.

Broader implications for global AI policy

Everyday impact before frontier risks

Research on frontier AI risks must continue, but the India AI Impact Summit signals an important rebalancing of global attention, as mentioned before. It asks policymakers to look beyond hypothetical future scenarios to acknowledge how AI is already shaping critical aspects of our daily lives, from healthcare triage and classroom instruction to welfare delivery, agricultural advice and urban mobility.

For most people, the urgent question is not whether AI poses an existential threat, but whether the systems they encounter today are reliable, safe and genuinely useful. The summit’s focus on practical impact aligns global governance with lived reality.

Ensuring AI benefits for everyone

A second implication is the reaffirmation that inclusion is not a downstream concern but a prerequisite for responsible AI. Global conversations often gravitate toward powerful models built in highly resourced environments, yet billions of people rely on limited connectivity, low digital literacy and minority-language interfaces.

India’s leadership places these conditions at the centre of the global agenda. It broadens the imagination of what “good AI” must account for, reminding the world that both equitable deployment and cutting-edge capability are essential to whether AI helps or harms societies.

Building a more open and collaborative ecosystem

The summit also nudges the world toward a more open and cooperative model of AI development. Some countries can share tools, datasets, and governance mechanisms to help each other build their own capabilities rather than remain passive consumers. Openness here is not about lowering standards; it is about raising the global floor and ensuring that safety capacity grows alongside access. Many countries want to participate meaningfully in the AI economy, and the summit offers a platform to explore practical pathways for doing so.

What the world should take away from Delhi

The India AI Impact Summit 2026 is more than just another international meeting because it represents a shift from abstract debates to concrete action. Its core question — how to make AI useful, safe and inclusive at scale — goes to the heart of global governance. If the summit delivers practical tools, clearer deployment pathways and stronger cross-regional collaboration, it will set a new benchmark for what international coordination on AI can achieve.

The world is watching India, not because it claims to have all the answers, but because it has repeatedly demonstrated the ability to turn large-scale ideas into real-world outcomes.  And it has done so while openly confronting the tensions and trade-offs that accompany such efforts. In a period of rapid technological change, this experience is invaluable.

As AI evolves, the global community will increasingly need countries that can translate principles into practice at a population scale. The India AI Impact Summit is a chance to advance that work. If successful, its influence will extend far beyond India, shaping how the world understands and pursues responsible AI in the years ahead.

The post The Global South can shape AI in practical terms: Why the India AI Impact Summit Matters appeared first on OECD.AI.