NVIDIA has one of the largest and most complex supply chains in the world, and its performance is measured from wafer-out to first token. The interval is in two...
NVIDIA has one of the largest and most complex supply chains in the world, and its performance is measured from wafer-out to first token. The interval is in two parts. Time-to-rack runs from silicon leaving the fab to an assembled system arriving on a data center floor. Time-to-token covers everything thereafter: power, cooling, networking, and the software stack that makes the infrastructure…
Enterprise work spans messages, decisions, projects, and obligations that change over time. An AI agent that starts without this context must reconstruct it...
Enterprise work spans messages, decisions, projects, and obligations that change over time. An AI agent that starts without this context must reconstruct it before contributing. To provide agents with this necessary context, our team used NVIDIA NemoClaw to build a memory-driven Chief of Staff. It maintains a human-readable knowledge layer called the self model: an agent memory of relevant…
This post is the third in a series on AI model co-design. It explores how to accelerate LLM inference while maintaining accuracy using speculative decoding and...
This post is the third in a series on AI model co-design. It explores how to accelerate LLM inference while maintaining accuracy using speculative decoding and offers five guidelines for selecting draft length and draft mechanism across the Pareto frontier. For a discussion of how model design choices impact both throughput and interactivity without sacrificing accuracy, see AI Model Co…
Documentation files on more than 100 websites are referencing potentially dangerous executable content that gets installed automatically when visited by many AI agents. A few dozen companies, some of them Fortune 500s, are among those that executed proof-of-concept code. At least one misconfigured site is directing visitors, human or AI, to live malware.
The potentially dangerous content is in llms.txt and llms-full.txt files, an emerging convention websites employ to provide machine-readable summaries of the site’s content and its high-level structure. These files are the AI equivalent of the robots.txt standard that instructs search engines how to index the site's content. Google Lighthouse, a tool for helping web developers, has more here. Correctly configured llms.txt and llms-full.txt files for Cloudflare are here and here.
How the researchers found it
Researchers at a stealth startup in Israel scanned 6,214 live domains belonging to defense contractors, Fortune 500, and Big Tech companies. Of the 8,265 llms.txt and llms-full.txt files they found (many sites hosted both an llms.txt and an llms-full.txt file), 120 of them, each on a different site, pointed to one or more code packages or domain names that weren’t registered. To test what happens when an AI agent processes such files, the researchers registered a handful of the unclaimed names and hosted packages that caused any machine executing them to reach out to their server. Within an hour, the researchers received a phone-home response from a Fortune 500 company. Over time, they got a few dozen more, some from more Fortune 500 companies and others from startups. Their beacon also recorded the chain of parent processes that spawned each install, ultimately revealing that coding agents, including Claude, OpenAI's Codex, and Nous Research's Hermes, were involved. Anthropic, OpenAI, and Nous Research did not respond to requests for comment by the time of publication.
The OpenAI agents involved in last month’s incursion into Hugging Face were trained so heavily on winning a competition that they pursued a relentless campaign to cheat, a new report documented. In the process, and without authorization, they created an improvised message board to hatch a plan that ultimately landed them squarely inside the latter company’s network.
Over the course of May and June, OpenAI gave the agents what the company described as “impossible tasks” to complete on the benchmarking framework ExploitGym. The internal test was designed to test how the agents would respond. To get a full understanding of the agent capabilities, company engineers disabled safety guardrails that normally are in place to prevent the sort of hacks that eventually hit Hugging Face and one other undisclosed organization. The stymied agents’ training made them so focused on winning that they performed tasks they were never explicitly instructed to follow.
Cheaters gonna cheat
The first step was creating a message board that allowed the agents to pass notes to each other. OpenAI hadn’t provided any such platform, so the agents repurposed a platform called Artifactory, which OpenAI was using in internal testing of several unreleased hacking agents. OpenAI was using Artifactory as one of the measures to prevent the agents from egressing its isolated sandboxes and accessing the Internet, while at the same time simulating a real-world hacking environment.
The Pew Research Center analyzed nearly half a million English-language web pages for AI-generated content. More than a third of pages published since ChatGPT's launch show signs of machine-written text, and commercial .com sites are ten times more likely to contain AI content than .edu or .gov domains.
Building an AI agent does not end with choosing a single model. Each model has its own strengths, weaknesses, and cost profile, which can shift from one...
Building an AI agent does not end with choosing a single model. Each model has its own strengths, weaknesses, and cost profile, which can shift from one workload to another—or even within the same workload. For example, an agentic task may need classification for one step, reasoning for the next, and a smaller model for routine follow-up tasks. Sending every request to the largest model can…
Last week’s unprecedented security event in which two OpenAI security hacking models trespassed into the network of fellow AI company Hugging Face was enabled by exploiting one or more zero-day vulnerabilities in Artifactory, JFrog, the product’s developer, said Monday.
In an incident mimicking a dystopian sci-fi novel, two OpenAI models broke out of the restricted environment meant to keep them from accessing the Internet during an internal test, the AI company revealed last week. The models went on to breach Hugging Face’s network and steal confidential information and credentials. OpenAI said its agent achieved the feat by exploiting a previously unknown vulnerability. The company called the event “unprecedented,” and outsiders largely agreed.
Not the triumph it was made out to be
OpenAI said the models exploited multiple attack vectors, including stolen credentials and zero-days, to gain remote code execution capabilities, but until now, the vulnerable software was unknown. JFrog’s Monday disclosure said the product was a self-managed instance Artifactory, a repository management system that secures and streamlines customers’ software development operations. JFrog says Artifactory is used by more than 7,500 developer Teams, 80 percent of which work for Fortune 100 companies.
Building a great AI agent isn’t just about choosing the right models. The harness is the architecture surrounding the model. How it renders context, executes...
Building a great AI agent isn’t just about choosing the right models. The harness is the architecture surrounding the model. How it renders context, executes actions, manages state, and decides when a task is done shapes outcomes just as much as the model itself. Harness design alone can account for double-digit swings in benchmark results and significant differences in token cost…
Modern chip design is increasingly limited by engineering time. Register transfer level (RTL) development and verification require specialized hardware...
Modern chip design is increasingly limited by engineering time. Register transfer level (RTL) development and verification require specialized hardware knowledge, precise reasoning, and repeated interaction with electronic design automation (EDA) tools. LLMs have accelerated code generation, and AI agents extend their impact by using verification feedback to iteratively correct errors.
Every byte moved has a cost. As model checkpoints grow to hundreds of gigabytes or even a terabyte, that cost adds up quickly. To make things even worse, moving...
Every byte moved has a cost. As model checkpoints grow to hundreds of gigabytes or even a terabyte, that cost adds up quickly. To make things even worse, moving these model weights around the cluster is extremely common. For instance, a cold start may pull weights from remote storage into GPU memory; autoscaling and rolling updates must populate each new replica; and RL post-training continuously…
Prompt injections, the malicious commands attackers embed into content to entice large language models to follow them, have been attackers’ go-to tool for turning AI platforms against their users. A well-phrased command sneaked into an email or calendar invitation is often all it takes to cause the LLM to exfiltrate sensitive data or follow other harmful actions.
Now, defenders are embracing the prompt injection, too.
A strong, sharp effect
Researchers from Tracebit on Monday said they found that placing prompt injections alongside passwords, cryptographic keys, and other secrets stored on Amazon Web Services was often all that was needed to shut down attacks from AI hacking agents. The prompts direct the attacking LLM to perform an action forbidden by its guardrails, the safety barriers AI developers erect to prevent it from taking harmful actions. The LLM responds by shutting down.
AI performance comes down to three dimensions: Accuracy: How well the model reasons and produces outputs Throughput: How many tokens per second a...
AI performance comes down to three dimensions: Deployments must balance all three: High accuracy is wasted if responses are slow, and raw throughput means little if each user’s experience is laggy. Practical systems therefore optimize accuracy, throughput, and interactivity together. This post focuses on throughput and interactivity, and how model-design choices shape both without…
In the brief history of AI security, the prompt injection has quickly become the top threat. Large language models are inherently unable to distinguish between legitimate instructions provided by users and malicious ones sneaked into emails, source code, and other third-party content the models are processing. This makes it trivial to surreptitiously inject malicious commands that the LLM readily follows.
With no way to enforce this crucial boundary between trusted and untrusted sources, AI engine developers are left to erect elaborate guardrails designed to mitigate the damage rather than solve the root cause.
To date, most prompt injections have fallen into a class known as push, in which each potential victim is targeted. For example, the adversary injects malicious instructions into an individual email or calendar invitation. Because the injection must then be sent (or pushed) to each specific target, the scale of the attack is limited, hampering mass exploits that hit the Internet at large.
Industrial machinery generates more alarms than technicians can triage. For each important alarm requiring follow-up, the technician pulls historical context,...
Industrial machinery generates more alarms than technicians can triage. For each important alarm requiring follow-up, the technician pulls historical context, determines the correct procedure, checks whether a specialist signal confirms the failure mode, and writes up a recommendation. This process remains consistent, and is well-suited for an AI agent. This post discusses a per-alarm…
Makers of AI browsers make lofty promises. With a single prompt, users can ask one to find a restaurant in a particular part of town, reserve a table, invite a colleague to lunch, and email a confirmation. These makers are much more reticent about the risks of blurring the once fine line between browsing sites and asking a large language model a question or instructing it to take potentially sensitive actions.
LLM developers’ answer so far has been to build guardrails that make some requests off-limits. Developing software exploits, stealing credentials, or teaching how to build a pipe bomb are examples. The problem with this approach is that the guardrails are reactive and treat the symptoms rather than solve the root cause. It’s tantamount to the manufacturer of an unsafe vehicle advocating for new road designs rather than fixing the flaws that make it prone to accidents.
Lulling LLMs into an alternate reality
New research puts this predicament on sharp display. It demonstrates how a website can lull AI browsers into a false reality where the rules governing its behavior no longer apply. After that, an attacker has free rein to invoke all kinds of destructive actions, such as extracting code from a private repository or extracting credentials from the built-in password manager.
Last Tuesday, Microsoft patched a vulnerability it rated as max critical in its M365 Copilot AI platform. On Monday, the researchers who discovered the vulnerability and reported it to Microsoft revealed how their proof-of-concept exploit could retrieve 2FA codes and other sensitive data from emails accessible to Copilot.
Microsoft and other LLM providers have been unable to prevent their products from complying with malicious requests to reveal data. The root cause: AI bots are unable to distinguish between instructions provided by users and those snuck into third-party content the models are summarizing, drafting responses to, or using to perform other actions on behalf of the user. With no way to secure this crucial boundary, Microsoft and its peers are left to erect complicated and ad hoc guardrails designed to rein in the consequences of this incurable gullibility.
Jumping over guardrails
One guardrail built into Copilot and most other LLMs prevents them from submitting web forms, sending emails, and taking similar actions that can be used to exfiltrate data from the user. To work around this, LLM hackers turned to markup language, which, among other things, allows users to add formatting elements such as headings, lists, and links to text without the need for HTML tags. Another workaround is to wrap sensitive data inside HTML tags such as <img> and <form>. In either case, a web request showing the data hits the attacker’s web server, where the secret information is captured in logs.
As AI infrastructure scales, enterprise expectations for operational maturity are increasing. Organizations expect these systems to be provisionable,...
As AI infrastructure scales, enterprise expectations for operational maturity are increasing. Organizations expect these systems to be provisionable, observable, secure, and manageable at scale—the same standard applied to all critical infrastructure. The moment an AI system moves from development into enterprise deployment, that operational foundation is essential. NVIDIA DGX Spark and…
Single-turn chatbots are evolving into long-running agents that can reason, maintain context, use tools, and run efficiently across many turns to complete...
Single-turn chatbots are evolving into long-running agents that can reason, maintain context, use tools, and run efficiently across many turns to complete complex workflows. However, these multi-agent workflows cause token counts to grow quickly. Agents plan, call tools, invoke sub-agents, receive information, and then pass history, outputs, and reasoning steps back into the model…
AI agents are changing how you interact with your PC. Creators, developers, and AI enthusiasts are already using these agents extensively to assist with...
AI agents are changing how you interact with your PC. Creators, developers, and AI enthusiasts are already using these agents extensively to assist with day-to-day tasks such as coding, video editing, and content management. NVIDIA and Microsoft are teaming up to enable the next generation of developers to build on-device agents on the Windows platform, with easier setup, native security…
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NVIDIA has one of the largest and most complex supply chains in the world, and its performance is measured from wafer-out to first token. The interval is in two...